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WHATS IN A NAME?: AN ARGUMENT FOR A SMALL
BUSINESS "LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY" STATUTE
(WITH THREE SUBSETS OF DEFAULT RULES)
Dale A. Oesterle"
Wayne M. Gazur**

The recent proliferation of small business entity forms is primarily a
result of their tax characterization. With the recent adoption of the
IRS "check-the-box" regulations and, as a consequence, the elimination of traditional tax distinctions, many of these forms have lost
their appeal. This article proposes starting over with one form, the
'limited liability entity." PartI discusses the history of small business
forms. Part II analyzes the current forms in light of the recent checkthe-box legislation. Part III discusses the necessity of and rationale
behind a unified entity statute. Finally, Part IV outlines a unified
limited liability entity statute with four alternative forms.
INTRODUCTION

In Colorado, our home state, the organizers of a small business
can now choose one of nine domestic forms: a general partnership,1 a
limited liability partnership (LLP),2 a limited partnership, 3 a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP),4 a limited liability company (LLC),5
a limited partnership association (LPA),6 a regular corporation, 7 which
' Monfort Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Colorado School of Law.
B.A., M.P.P., and J.D., University of Michigan.
"' Associate Professor of Business and Law, University of Colorado, College of Business and Administration/School of Law (joint position). B.S., University of Wyoming;
J.D., University of Colorado; L.L.M., University of Denver.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Carolyn J. Fairless, a
student at the University of Colorado School of Law, and the helpful comments of
Clifford J. Calhoun and Alan R. Palmiter in reviewing an early draft of this article.
1. COLO. REV.STAT. §§ 7-60-102 to -154 (Supp. 1996).
2. The limited liability partnership provisions are scattered throughout the general
partnership statute. See, e.g., id. § 7-60-144 (Supp. 1996) (registration procedure); id.
§ 7-60-115(2) (nature of a partner's liability); id. § 7-60-146 (limitation on distributions);
id. § 7-60-153 (application of case law under which corporate veil of a corporation may
be pierced).
3. Id. §§ 7-62-101 to -1104.
4. The limited liability provisions are woven into the limited partnership statute.
See, ag., id. § 7-62-403(2)(a) (liability of a general partner); id. § 7-62-1104 (registration
provisions).
5. Id. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101.
6. See id. § 7-63-101 to -117. For a discussion of early limited partnership association law, see Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company,
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in turn can be taxed under subchapters C or S8 of the Internal Revenue Code, a professional corporation (PC), 9 and a cooperative. 10 If this
is not enough, the organizers can look across the border and choose to
be a Wyoming statutory business trust." Colorado's situation is, of
course, not unique; it is replicated in most states, 12 but for the details.
This array of choices presents a false richness.
Initially the stakes were high. Drafters of the new small business
forms aimed to decouple limited liability from a corporate level tax.
Through the new forms organizers avoided classification as an "associ41 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 387, 393-94 (1991). The LPA statutes were enacted in Colorado
to serve primarily as an estate planning structure. See infra text accompanying notes
188-92.
7. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-101 to 7-117-105 (Supp. 1996). For jurisdictions with
close corporation statutes, that is an additional alternative.
8. Of course, while regular C corporation status is available to almost all comers
(except for special cases like insurance companies, mutual funds, and tax exempt corporations), the S corporation provisions are unavailable for certain types of corporations
and shareholdings. See generally I.R:C. §§ 1361-1398 (1994).
9. In Colorado, a professional corporation is organized under the general corporation statute, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-101 to 7-117-105, but the articles of incorporation
must also include additional prescribed provisions pertinent to the provision of professional services. For law firms, the additional provisions are contained in Colorado Supreme Court Rule 265. COLO. R. Civ. P. 265. For other professions, the additional provisions are prescribed by statute. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-2-117 (Supp. 1996)
(accountants); id. § 12-4-110 (architects); id. § 12-33-124 (chiropractors).
10. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-56-101 to -901 (Supp. 1996). Although agricultural
marketing cooperatives remain a clear subject of the legislation, after the July 1, 1996,
amendments, the statute also "enable[s] all types of industries and enterprises to avail
themselves of the benefits of the cooperative form of doing business in accordance with
the provisions of this article." See id. § 7-56-102(c). Inasmuch as the organizational provisions refer to articles of incorporation, incorporators, stock, and shareholders, see id.
§ 7-56-201, and the provisions of the general incorporation act shall apply to matters not
otherwise addressed, see id. § 7-56-507(1), it would appear that a cooperative would be
sufficiently "describe[d] or refer[red] to ... as incorporated or as a corporation" for purposes of the per se corporate tax characterization under the new check-the-box regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1996). Special federal taxation provisions govern the taxation of cooperatives, including an income exclusion for net profits (if any,
particularly if transactions are at cost) paid out in the form of patronage dividends that
can minimize the tax on any net profits. See I.R.C. §§ 1381-1388 (1994). It is difficult to
predict whether the cooperative form will be embraced by users outside the traditional
commodity focus in which members are returned portions of the net profits of the cooperative on some formula, often based upon "patronage" reflected by the level of sales to,
or purchases from, the cooperative.
11. See Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of
State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
881, 914-17 (1995) (discussing the Delaware and Wyoming statutory trust provisions).
Connecticut has joined Delaware and Wyoming in enacting statutory business trust legislation, effective October 1, 1997. See Connecticut Statutory Trust Act, 1996 Conn. Acts,
Pub. Act No. 96-271, §§ 219-253 (Reg. Sess.). While not a full statutory trust act, Washington, by statute, recognizes the validity of the Massachusetts business trust. See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23.90.030, .040, .050, .060, .900 (West 1994).
12. All 50 states have some form of general partnership, limited partnership, LLC,
and corporation-enabling legislation. At this time, at least 41 states and the District of
Columbia have LLP legislation. See infra note 21.
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ation" taxable as a corporation. 13 For a decade, the IRS, through incremental revenue rulings, 14 revenue procedures, 15 and private letter rulings, 16 gradually relaxed its definition of association. With each new
IRS ruling, states added to or amended their statutes. But then the
IRS proposed to change the basic rule, and thus the game. Its willingness to make pass-through treatment available to all unincorporated
associations, irrespective of internal structure, through the implementation of its so-called "check-the-box" regulations 7 has lowered the
13. The corporate income tax is imposed on every "corporation." See I.R.C. § 11(a)
(1994). In turn, "[tihe term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and
insurance companies." Id. § 7701(a)(3). The income tax treatment of unincorporated associations as either partnerships or corporations was guided by the Treasury regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1977); id. § 301.7701-2 (1993); id. § 301.7701-3
(1995). While the Service was not very successful in the judicial arena in characterizing
entities as corporations, see, e.g., MCA Inc. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099, 1101 (9th
Cir. 1982); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976); Zuckman v. United States, 524
F.2d 729, 733 (Ct. Cl. 1975); the severe consequences attendant to such characterization
ensured attention to avoid such a result. The measures included opinion letters of counsel concerning the characterization issue, careful attention to the language and structure
of partnership agreements, and practitioner attentiveness to the changing positions of
the Service as demonstrated in rulings and procedural announcements. The area has
been a field day for continuing legal education program sponsors and academic writers.
See, eg., A&MERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOMiE TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER K PROPOSALS
OF THE AIERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE ON THE TAXATION OF PARTNERS 377, 386 (1984) (stating
that a limited partnership that has a corporate general partner with insignificant assets
should not be taxed as a corporation); Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither PartnershipTaxation?,
47 TAX L. REV. 105 (1991) (proposing taxation of entities based on the distinction between large business ventures and small ones); Susan Pace Hamill, The Taxation of Domestic Limited Liability Companies and Limited Partnerships:A Case for Eliminating
the PartnershipClassification Regulations, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 565 (1995) (proposing the
elimination of partnership classification regulations when taxing domestic LLCs and
limited partnerships); Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification: The One Hundred-Year
Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437 (1995) (discussing the failure of the corporate resemblance test); Fred W. Peel, Definition of a Partnership:New Suggestions on an Old Issue,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 989 (exploring legislative and regulatory possibilities for improving the
characterization issue).
14. See, eg., Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233;
Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-2 C.B. 316.
15. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
16. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Dec. 6, 1991).
17. On May 9, 1996, the IRS issued proposed regulations that would implement
the so-called "check-the-box" proposal for entity income tax classification. See Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -4, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989-97 (1996). These proposed regulations were finalized in December 1996. T.D. 8697, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (1996). Essentially, an unincorporated domestic association will be treated as a partnership as a default matter. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (1996). However, the entity can
affirmatively elect to be treated as a corporation for income tax purposes. Id. § 301.77013. A one-member association is, as a default matter, not treated as a taxable entity; it
can affirmatively elect corporate status. Id. This resolves the prior uncertainty concerning the treatment of one-member LLCs. See generally Scott E. Grimes et al., Proposed
Entity ClassificationRegs. Greatly Simplify Rules, 25 TAX'N FOR LAW. 68 (1996) (discussing the current classification regulations and the implications of the proposed classification regulations). There is a lot of optimism about the practical effects of the IRS liberalization. A practicing real estate attorney reportedly "wonders if the new regulations will
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stakes. Tax savings through choice of form are now, with the exception
of estate and employment taxes, minimal.
The new forms are now enjoyed only by legal hobbyists, who debate their microscopic differences with relish and seriousness. Others
find the still-developing maze of alternate forms of business organization difficult to navigate and unduly costly. There are needless opportunities for error. Those lawyers and clients who have to choose among
them and work with them suffer the inconvenience and confusion of
yet another example of an excess of law and lawyering.
Moreover, the choices among current statutory forms are irrational. Three controlling influences commingle to create a bizarre system of small business classification. First, many of the statutes still
contain obsolete provisions based on the old IRS definition. Second, the
title attached to a small business form-company, partnership, or corporation-affects the treatment of the business under a wide variety of
other regulatory statutes-liquor licenses, for example, which are
themselves also now obsolete. Third, those amending the various statutory forms are driving all forms toward each other. The drafters are
attempting to allow businesses to register under whatever title they
need for external regulatory advantage and, at the same time, contract
specifically for the internal form of organization they prefer.
We need to start from scratch. Without the income tax-dictated
facets of the entities, it is now easier to construct a business organization statute that is internally coherent, flexible, understandable, and
consistent with organizers' intuitive sense of how the structure should
work. In that regard, we propose guidelines for such legislation.
I. A

SHORT HISTORY OF THE RAPID MUTATION AND PROLIFERATION OF

SMALL BusINEss FORMS
A. The Breach in the Dam: The 1988 IRS Revenue Ruling on the Wyoming LLC
The success of the LLC was the catalyst for change. Once the federal income tax consequences of the Wyoming LLC were somewhat assured by a 1988 IRS revenue ruling,1 8 the number of adopting states
spark a real estate boom similar to the explosion of the 1980s, which was partly driven
by changes in the tax law." Paula Moore, Proposed Regulations Would Simplify Deals,
DENY. Bus. J., May 31, 1996, at 6A. "The regulations 'will level the playing field' for
small-firm general practitioners, says Mark Ferguson of Charleston, West Virginia, a tax
attorney who helped draft his state's LLC statute." James L. Dam, Tax Lawyer Special.
ists Are No Longer Needed for LLCs, LAw. WKLY. USA, June 3, 1996, at 1. While the formation and entity characterization issues are simplified, the tax lawyers will still have a
full menu with language for special allocations of losses, passive activity loss limitation
planning, and estate planning considerations, to name but a few.
18. The revenue ruling according partnership income tax treatment to the Wyoming LLC, Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, produced some certainty of result. That ruling was the first of many, which became gradually more liberal. See Wayne M. Gazur,
The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58
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rose from two in early 1990 to fifty (plus the District of Columbia) by
1996.1' The LLC was propelled through legislatures by a force of accountants, tax lawyers, and business development lobbies that met little organized opposition.2 Although sharing both partnership and corporate characteristics, the LLC was a new entity. The newness
appeared to be part of the allure, and there was little scholarly debate
over the desirable contours of the legislation in advance of enactment.
With the LLC "gold standard" of pass-through income taxation
and limited liability for all, one might have predicted that other existing forms would either need to change or become unimportant. The
former prediction was correct. Limited liability was extended to general partners of general partnerships under LLP legislation which
quickly spread across the United States. 21 In some states, the limited
liability shield was extended to the general partners of even limited
partnerships. 22 The impetus for these new partnership forms was an
odd combination of inertia and progressiveness. Lawyers and their clients were comfortable with partnerships and limited partnerships.
Their organizational form and the legal doctrines that controlled both
internal and external relationships among participants, although moving at the margins, were more or less established and known. Rather
than jump to a new entity ("Anyone have a good draft LLC operating
agreement?"), why not just add limited liability by statute to an old favorite? As a result, LLPs and LLLPs were born.
Indeed, our jump to LLPs and LLLPs after the LLC became ubiquitous suggests that the LLC is a historical accident. The LLC gained
acceptance after the Wyoming statute, largely ignored for eleven
years,23 was the subject of a favorable ruling by the IRS in 1988.24
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 139-43 (1995) (summarizing the history of the rise of the
LLC).
19. See Bruce D. Ely & Joseph K. Beach, The LLC Scoreboard, 72 TAX NOTES 119,
119-24 (1996); Gazur, supra note 18, at 140-41.
20. See Gazur, supra note 18, at 176-84 (describing the political constituencies involved in the rise of the LLC).
21. Presently, jurisdictions with some form of limited liability partnership legislation include: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Ely & Beach, supra note 19, at 119-24
(listing states with LLC and LLP legislation and pending proposals as of May 24, 1996).
For a critical evaluation of the LLP, see Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability
Partnerships:The Next Step in the Evolution of the UnincorporatedBusiness Organization, 51 Bus. LAw. 147 (1995).
22. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-62-101(12), -403(2) (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-214 (Supp. 1996); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 20.46, 20.1403(b) (Law. Co-op. 1990 &
Supp. 1996); TmL REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.14(a) (West Supp. 1996).
23. Prior to the second wave of LLC statute enactments which began in 1990, only
Florida, in 1982, had joined Wyoming in enacting such legislation. Gazur, supra note 18,
at 140.
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States rushed to adopt a version of the Wyoming LLC and later models based on this and later rulings. There was caution, occasionally excessive, 25 in this progression. Had instead an LLP statute or an LLLP
statute been the first presented to the IRS staff and received similar
administrative approval, we probably would never have witnessed the
growth of the LLC. We are better off perhaps with history as it is,
however, because the birth of the LLC has us rethinking the organization attributes of small business in ways
that a simple evolution of
26
partnerships into LLPs may never have.
There has been other experimentation with new entities, but it is
modest. Delaware and Wyoming have adopted a business trust statute 27 and Colorado adopted a limited partnership association statute.2
Perhaps we are approaching a period of some reflection, a lull after the
LLC frenzy in which to digest the check-the-box approach. In the wake
of final IRS adoption of those regulations, it is likely that many states
will tinker with their LLC statutes. 29 Also, legislation has been introduced in Pennsylvania, and planned for other states, that would coordinate certain aspects of business entity structures without limiting
the number of available choices. 30

24.

Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. For a discussion of this ruling, see supra note

18.
25. The preoccupation with foreign state recognition of the LLC entity ("We will
not use the LLC until all, or most all, states have adopted it") seemed unnecessary. Although predictions are hazardous, it would seem that foreign state recognition of the
LLC entity would be encouraged by principles of comity, by conflicts of laws principles
that apply the laws of the state of incorporation, and by interpretations of the US. Constitution's Interstate Commerce Clause. See generally Robert R. Keatinge et al., The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAw. 375, 447-56
(1992) ("[Iun actions against an LLC in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign court should
treat the LLC as though it were a foreign corporation and should apply the limited liability provisions of the LLC's state of organization.").
26. See Oesterle, supra note 11.
27. For a discussion of the statutory business trust, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of Colorado's LPA statute, see infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
29. States prohibiting the formation of one-member LLCs will probably move to
permit them, now that the federal income tax treatment is favorable. See supra note 17.
In addition, now that attributes such as dissolubility or member management are no
longer relevant to the income tax characterization inquiry, those state law aspects could
be modified.
30. See S. 1506, 180th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1996). The Pennsylvania proposal is organized in a so-called "hub and spoke" manner. Certain core features that are considered
central to all business entities (general and limited partnerships, LLCs, and corporations) are propounded in a consistent manner as the "hub." The existing separate entity
forms comprise the "spokes" and incorporate the common provisions of the hub. For a
description of Pennsylvania's business corporations law by one of its drafters, see
William H. Clark, Jr., What the Business World Is Looking for in an Organizational
Form: The PennsylvaniaExperience, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 156-73 (1997).
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Choice Among States as Distinguishedfrom Choices Within a State

1. Choice among states: our preoccupation with "uniform" state
statutes
The proliferation of entity choices is, at some level, desirable. Each
new entity is an experiment, and we gain information on each experiment's success or failure as time passes and entrepreneurs and professionals put the statutes to use. There is an important distinction, however, between choices among small business forms presented by
differences among states and choices presented by differences among
forms in any one state.
In theory, all states could have identical statutes which offer a
multitude of interstate choices among various small business forms.
This is what we, in large part, have now as states adopt minor variations of model or uniform acts prepared by national trade associations-the American Bar Association and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. There are model or uniform acts on corporations, 3 1
34
33
close corporations, 32 professional corporations, general partnerships,
35
36
limited partnerships, and limited liability companies. There is even
a model act for state anti-takeover legislation.3 7 We anticipate that
model acts on LLPs and LLLPs will soon appear.38
The advantages of model or uniform acts are often spoken of and
well understood. The acts represent the studied knowledge of experts
who can cull the best from existing legislation. 39 Individual states can
rely on this expertise and have better laws. Moreover, with our national markets, there is an advantage for all participants in intrastate
commerce when there is uniformity among states in regulations that
impact commercial matters. 40 What is less well understood is that the
uniform and model acts also have significant costs.
31.

See

32.

See MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SupP.

REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.ACT (1984).

(1984).

33. See MODEL PROF. CORP. SuPP.(1984).
34. See UNIF.PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA), 6 U.L.A. 238 (1995); REVISED UNIF. PARTNER-

SHIP ACT (RUPA), 6 U.L.A. 8 (1995).
35. See UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (ULPA), 6A U.L.A. 305 (1995); REVISED UNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA), 6A U.L.A. 59 (1995).
36. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (ULLCA), 6A U.L.A. 429 (1995).
37.

See MODEL CONTROL SHARE STATUTE (1989).

38. An American Bar Association Working Group on Registered Limited Liability

Partnerships has already produced a May 1995 draft of a Proposed Prototype Registered
Limited Liability Partnership Act. Reportedly, the National Conference of Commission-

ers on Uniform State Laws has appointed a Uniform Limited Liability Partnership Act
Drafting Committee that held its first meeting in November 1995. See ROBERT W.
HILLMAN ET AL., GENERAL AND LI rTED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE REVISED PART-

301-02 (1996).
39. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and

NERSHIP ACT

Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 947, 961 (1995).

40. Michael D. Weiss, Actually Shutting Down the Virtual Multistate Corporation,
28 IND. L. REV. 607, 666 n.189 (1995).
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Our obsession with "uniform" state statutes may restrict and retard an otherwise valuable and natural process of statutory evolution,
the state against state game of legal leapfrog. With respect to the LLC,
for example, Professor Ribstein has criticized the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA),41 arguing that the wide variation in
state LLC statutes that preceded the uniform act would, if left alone,
produce better legislation. 42 Uniformity would result after some experimentation in the ordinary course when ultimately desirable, but
ULLCA, he argued, would stunt the growth of the normal evolutionary
process of state legislation. 43 His predictions are borne out in part, perhaps, as changes in the income tax rules have made the dissolution
44
sections of ULLCA obsolete within months of their promulgation.
An inherent shortcoming of attempts at uniformity is that no
drafting project is perfect, and either uniformity is sacrificed when
adopting jurisdictions tinker with the model, or the statute suffers
from outright errors or misguided compromises that stubbornly persist. The growth and evolution of partnership law under the Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) and Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA)
is evidence that the adoption of a uniform act introduces an inordinate
amount of inertia for future changes. 45 UPA, for example, promulgated
in 1914, contained cumbersome and confusing provisions on wrongful
dissolution 46 and partnership by estoppel 47 State experimentation with
the troublesome sections was limited by their reluctance to tinker with
a uniform act. The dissolution and estoppel provisions survived until
1994, when they were changed by a new uniform act, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which made the dissolution provision
more complex and more technical. 4 Had various states been experimenting over time with more workable provisions, we would not be in
the mess we are in with RUPA.
2. Choice of forms within a single state: the title trap
A separate question is whether any single state should have one
small business form or many. Our argument in favor of having a single
statute is the subject of Part III below. As noted above, states have
chosen to have many forms and the number is growing. As a conse41. UNw. LTD. LiAR. Co. AcT (ULLCA), 6A UI.L.A. 429 (1995).
42. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 39, at 949-53 (discussing a number of
drawbacks posed by the uniform law).

43. See id. at 951-52.
44. See id. at 970-71.

45. The Uniform Partnership Act was adopted in 1914, UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
(UPA), 6 U.L.A. 127 (1995), and revised in 1994, REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
(RUPA), 6 U.L.A. 3 (1995). The Uniform Limited Partnership Act was adopted in 1916,
UNIT. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (ULPA), 6A U.L.A. 305 (1995), and revised in 1976 and
1985, REVISED UNIT. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA), 6A U.L.A. 2 (1995).
46. UNr. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA) § 38, 6 U.LA. 880; id. § 41, 6 U.L.A. 968-69.
47. Id. § 16, 6 U.L.A. 501.
48. See REVISED UNIT. PARTNERSHEP ACT (RUPA) §§ 601-807, 6 U.LA. 72-104.
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quence, the current system provides an intriguing mix of established,
predictable law, on the one hand, and highly flexible, uncharted alternatives on the other. The former is found in corporate codes and, with
some circumscribed alterations like the LLP changes, in the partnership acts. The LLC is the best example of the latter. In any system
with multiple entity choices, the undesirable choices will fall from
favor over time and become irrelevant. Recall the joint-stock association (or company), 49 the statutory partnership association, 0 and the
Massachusetts business trust.5 ' They have not, for some time, been on
the list of organizational alternatives for most practitioners.
If a new or improved form of business entity becomes dominant,
existing forms can enter the dustbin of history even without legislative
action. In the long run that will be the result, but one cannot minimize the costs of maintaining the professional and administrative
knowledge base during the period of decline. If forms have outlived
their usefulness or are redundant, it is wasteful to spend additional resources on perpetuating them.
At present, to be effective business counselors, Colorado lawyers
must learn in some detail the advantages and disadvantages of the
nine possible small business forms and communicate that information
accurately to their clients. Most academics are comfortable with the
proposition that states ought to provide different sets of default rules
for small business organizations. At issue is how we get there. Drafters designed the current forms primarily around tax avoidance and
that rationale has evaporated. Pure concerns of organizational structure were often an afterthought. These new entities consequently are
not those that we should look to for our different sets of default rules.
In a very real sense, we have yet to draft them.
With the importance of the differences between the current forms
diminished substantially by the IRS proposal, one wonders whether
the struggle to stay informed on whether state filing fees are lower for
LLCs than corporations, or on whether a state liquor license law includes LLCs, is worth the effort. The liquor license question has been
raised in an Oklahoma proceeding, Meyer v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission.52 Ms. Meyer sought a retail package store liquor license to be held by an LLC, but the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission determined that an
LLC is not entitled, under the Oklahoma Constitution, to receive and
49. For a discussion of the history of the joint-stock company, see William J.
Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 855,
872-77 (1995).
50. The statutory partnership association has recently been reborn in Colorado.
See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-63-101 to -117 (Supp. 1996).
51. For a discussion of the Massachusetts business trust, see Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d
704 (1978).
52. 890 P.2d 1361 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
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hold such a license. 53 The district court reversed the commission's ruling, but on appeal the commission's position was sustained.5 4
The Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission
based its ruling on language of the Oklahoma Constitution, which suggested that licenses could be issued only to "any person or general or
limited partnership." 5 Inasmuch as the opinion does not discuss this
point, it apparently was considered well-settled by the appellate court
that "person" in this context referred only to individuals. 6 In that posture, the issue was whether an LLC is a "general or limited partnership,"57 and Ms. Meyer's counsel, not surprisingly, argued that an LLC
is a partnership. 58 The appellate court's response was in part title
driven; "the act creating the business form [the LLC] is in Title 18,
which is entitled 'Corporations.'- 59 However, in this instance the court
did look behind titles. Individuals, partnerships, and limited partnerships share the common characteristic that at least one party has liability for business obligations.60 In contrast, all members of an LLC enjoy limited liability.61 The court concluded: "Our examination of the

pertinent constitutional provisions leads us to conclude that their evident purpose was the assignment of personal responsibility for compliance with the liquor laws. Thus, business forms that did not insure
such personal responsibility were excluded from eligibility for licensing."62 Do limited partnerships with a corporate general partner qual-

ify? It depends on how literally the Oklahoma courts read the constitutional term "limited partnership." Consider the result if Oklahoma had
adopted LLP or LLLP legislation, removing liability for all partici53. Id. at 1362.
54. Id. at 1362, 1364.
55. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 4.
56. We are not Oklahoma constitutional law scholars. However, in other parts of
the constitution, the reference to "persons" appears to be in reference to individuals.
See, eg., id. art. IX, § 15 ("A Corporation Commission is hereby created, to be composed
of three persons, who shall be elected by the people at a general election for State officers ... .); id. art. V, § 46 ("The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing... changing the names of
persons or places ... ."); id. art. II, § 27 ("Any person having knowledge or possession of
facts that tend to establish the guilt of any other person or corporation under the laws of
the state shall not be excused from giving testimony or producing evidence . . .

.").

In

one context the meaning of person is expanded to include "individuals, partnerships, and
corporations," suggesting that the regular meaning is more circumscribed. See id. art.
iX, § 34.
57. The Oklahoma Constitution also prohibits the issue of a retail package store or
wholesale distributor's license to a "corporation, business trust or secret partnershipf Id.
art. 28, § 10. Rather than holding that an LLC is like a "corporation" and thereby prohibited from holding a license, the opinion finds that an LLC is not a partnership and is
not therefore eligible in that manner. Meyer, 890 P.2d at 1363-64.
58. Meyer, 890 P.2d at 1363.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1364.
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pants. With such convergence of the forms, Ms. Meyer had a better argument had she used a title that more closely matched the constitutional language and gave her limited liability-an LLP.
The state liquor law example illustrates a hidden problem with
multiplying forms. Taxing authorities, law enforcement, and other government institutions that will deal with small business entities must
also invest resources in learning about the new entities.63 Until legislation affecting businesses catches up with the new forms, 64 choices
among the forms will not depend on the inherent quality of the forms
themselves, but on the status of immature, relevant doctrines in related fields. The popularity of the business trust as an investment vehicle is in part reportedly attributable to its acceptability for banking
and mutual fund regulatory purposes and to investors "burned" by investments bearing other titles like the "limited partnership."65
Other examples are not hard to find. Are LLC memberships securities? 66 Is the self-employment tax applicable to LLCs? 67 What is the
63. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, reportedly has taken the informal
position that an LLC is to be treated as a corporation, rather than as a partnership, for
Hart-Scott-Rodino notification purposes. See Robert R. Keatinge & Allan G. Donn, LLCs
and LLPs: Distinctions that Do Make a Difference, 3 J. LIMITED LIABILITY CoIapANIEs 3, 6
(1996).
64. The 1990 Act establishing the Colorado LLC included 17 pages of amendments
to a variety of Colorado statutes, generally adding the term "limited liability company"
to existing lists of business entities in numerous contexts. Colorado Limited Liability
Company Act, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414. Such measures address many of the obvious
problems, but not all.
65. I've been involved in several deals which used business trusts, both common law trusts and statutory trusts. In each of these deals, the parties were
institutions. In some cases, the institutions could not invest in partnerships
because of restrictions in their charters (e.g., mutual funds can typically buy
trust interests but not partnership or LLC interests). I was also involved in a
public commodities fund structured as a Delaware business trust. The underwriters didn't want to sell partnership interest for marketing reasons.
Steven G. Frost, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships(posted Nov. 1, 1996)
<http'//www.ljex3tra.com/mailinglists/lnet-llc/1657.html>.
My recollection was that historically many US banks used business
trusts to own real property because their charters prohibited direct ownership of real estate and/or investments in partnerships.
We have also seen business trusts used in lieu of limited partnerships for
marketing reasons. Since the late 1980s and into the 1990s, many promoters
are loath to use limited partnerships because of the negative connotations in
the syndication markets. Business trusts are sometimes viewed as an
alternative.
Thomas C. Bell, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships (posted Nov. 1, 1996)
<http//Nvmv.ljextra.com/mailinglists/lnet-llc/1658.html>.
66. Since LLC ownership interests are not "stock," they are not expressly listed
under the definition of "security" under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)
(1994), but may meet the definition of an "investment contract," which is expressly
listed. Id. The question, "What's in a name?," is significant, at least initially, in this inquiry. This issue is also important for state ("Blue Sky") securities law regulatory purposes and has generated a lot of commentary. See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited
Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not Be Treated as Securities and Possi-
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citizenship of an LLC for federal diversity jurisdiction? 68 Is a state

statutory provision that dissolves an LLC upon a bankruptcy petition
by a member enforceable in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding to
terminate the debtor's LLC membership? 69 Can LLC members opt out
ble Steps to Encourage This Result, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1304 (1994) (arguing that "a

presumption against application of the federal securities laws seems justified if the LLC
is truly to be a boon to the small business"); Park McGinty, The Limited Liability Company: Opportunity for Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. Rsv. 369, 371
(1996) (suggesting that "Congress amend the securities laws to allow participants in
LLCs to choose whether to be covered"); Larry E. Ribstein, Form and Substance in the
Definition of a "Security" The Case of Limited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 807, 810 (1994) (stating that "LLC interests, like partnership interests, should be
at least strongly presumed not to be 'securities' "); Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1069, 1102-03 (1992) (concluding that
LLCs are not securities under most instances); Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability Company Interests as Securities:An Analysis of Federal and State Actions Against Limited
Liability Companies Under the Securities Laws, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 425, 494 (1996) (arguing that each LLC offering must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis until legislatures
expressly state that all LLC interests are securities); Robert R. Joseph, Comment,
Should Interests in Limited Liability Companies Be Deemed Securities?: The Resurgence
of Economic Reality in Investment ContractAnalysis, 44 EMonY L.J. 1591, 1630 (1995)
(arguing that a "needs-based" analysis should be applied to determine whether an LLC
is a security); Jeffrey A. Mannisto, Comment, Mississippi Limited Liability Companies:
Potential Exposure Under Federal and State Securities Laws, 64 Miss. L.J. 173, 198-99
(1994) (stating that LLCs should initially be presumed to be securities under Mississippi
law, but the presumption is rebuttable when several conditions are met).
67. An important issue for small-business clients and their counsel is avoiding the
federal employment taxes on self-employment income or wages. The IRS has proposed
regulations that would treat income earned by all active members of a member-managed
LLC as self-employment income. See infra note 100. This is a developing issue, and
practitioners are proposing all sorts of avoidance structures, such as creating "subsidiary" LLCs that would hold the business assets, while funneling the income into a "parent LLC; the hope is that the earnings from the lower tier would be considered as investment income rather than earned income. See Francis J. Mellen, Jr. et al., Limited
Liability Companies and Registered Limited LiabilityPartnershipsin Kentucky: A Practical Analysis, 22 N. Ky. L. REv. 229, 310 (1995). Others would create classes of LLC interests without voting rights, to resemble a passive limited partner interest, thereby avoiding earned income classification. See Are Lawyers in LLCs Exempt from SelfEmployment Taxes?, 82 J. TAX'N 190, 190 (1995). Others advocate the use of S corporations as members of the LLC. The potential self-employment income is arguably "laundered" by passing through the S corporation, where it emerges as undistributed S corporation taxable income, or as an S corporation dividend, neither of which is selfemployment income. In that regard, aggressive distributions of earned income through
the dividend route toward avoidance of employment taxes have met resistance in the
courts. See, eg., Joseph Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Wis.
1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that "an employer should not be permitted to evade FICA and FUTA by characterizing all of an employee's remuneration as
something other than 'wages' "). For a discussion of the self-employment tax issue in the
context of S corporations, see infra note 109.
68. See, e.g., Carlos v. Adamany, No. 95C50264, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5764 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 17, 1996) (mem.) (applying a "nerve center" test).
69. See, eg., In re Daugherty Constr., Inc., 188 B.R. 607 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995)
(holding that the Nebraska LLC statute dissolution provisions were not enforceable in
bankruptcy). See generally James J. Wheaton, Dumping Deadbeats:Enforcing Limited
Liability Entity Agreements in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LIMITED LIABILITY ComPANIEs 60 (1996)
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of workers' compensation coverage?70 Is an LLC subject to state laws
that prohibit pro se representation of "corporations"? 71 Which entities
get favorable estate tax valuation consideration under Internal Revenue Code § 2704?72 And so on.
Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi have recently made the point
that states with a variety of statutes can serve a variety of "clienteles"
who, for various reasons, group in one or more of the forms.7 3 States
without the smorgasbord will be at a "competitive disadvantage."7 4 The
examples they cite, however, may demonstrate that specific groups
often choose selected forms, not because of their internal advantages,
but because of how they fit in other regulatory systems, many of which
are themselves obsolete or immature. In other words, the new forms
may encourage ossification of obsolete classification systems by allowing specific targeted groups to use novel forms of business entities
to avoid the regulation. We would prefer it the other way around, that
obsolete classification systems be the systems that are modernized.
Professional firms provide a unique case, preferring the LLP form
largely because of client perceptions. 7 5 Hot-shot lawyers in firms are
"partners," not "members." So, due to client perceptions, law firms
would rather be LLPs. This is an argument in support of two statutes
of identical provisions on internal governance, perhaps with different
entity titles. However, this is not an argument in support of two entities with different sets of default rules. Indeed, the push to "open up"
the mandatory provisions of partnership statutes (and thus, to make
them more like the LLC statutes) is a direct response to this phenomenon. In sum, the claim that specified "clienteles" need different entity
statutes is not necessarily an argument that specified groups are deciding among different entities based on different sets of default rules
on the matters of internal corporate governance.
(noting the conflicting views held by courts in these cases and urging nonbankrupt partners and members to take precautions to avoid adverse bankruptcy decisions).
70. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-41-202 (Supp. 1996) (extending to LLC members
the opt-out privilege enjoyed by corporate officers).
71. See, eg., Poore v. Fox Hollow Enters., C.A. No. 93A-09-005, 1994 Del. Super.
LEXIS 193 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 1994) (stating that an LLC, like a corporation, must
be represented by a licensed attorney), aff'd sub nom. Poore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 375 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1994).
72. For a discussion of I.R.C. § 2704, see infra notes 163-72 and accompanying
text. The LLC and the limited partnership (as well as the limited partnership association) are competing structures for family estate planning. See infra Part II.E.
73. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34
ECON. INQUIRY 464, 469-70 (1996) (suggesting an expanded role for unguided jurisdictional competition and less reliance on centralized uniform lawmaking).
74. Id.
75. Although admittedly anecdotal, the authors have heard of several Colorado law
firms that switched from LLC to LLP status, in part because of the familiarity with
partnership law, but also because of the "partner" title. On the other hand, some commentators have been somewhat critical of the LLP in comparison with the LLC. See
Keatinge et al., supra note 21, at 203-04.
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With the current proliferation of new entities, some may wonder
why we should not take a breather and see how what we have will
work out. Under normal circumstances, the argument would have real
bite. We are not under normal circumstances. Most of the new entities
were created to take advantage of a moving interpretation of a provision of the Internal Revenue Code. The provision has been simplified,
knocking the underpinnings out of the rationale for most of the new
entities. If the entities survive, alternative rationales will be found,
and if found, the new rationale will require that the statutes be
amended to correspond better to the new policy foundations.

II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TI

CURRENT FoRMs OF ORGANIZATION

The IRS's check-the-box regulations have eliminated, at least
among unincorporated business associations, the need to design busi76
ness forms around the federal income tax definition of "association."
The focus in choice among entities ought to shift in large part to the
entities' organizational characteristics. Do the entities provide rules
that optimize the effectiveness of structure for a substantial group of
potential users? If this question dominates entity choice, then we
would expect to see real, substantial differences in internal structure
among the entities, giving potential users of all stripes real choices in
form.
Unfortunately, as noted above, entity characterizations, primarily
based on titles ("corporation" or "partnership"), also can have an impact on a firm's treatment under a variety of collateral tax and regulatory systems. If these external characterizations dominate entity
choice, then we should expect to see drafters amend the various entities so that they all gravitate toward a basic set of principles, which
provide for a substantial amount of individual modification. The real
choice is among titles, not the substance of the structure. Users pick a
title and then customize a basic provision to address individual organizational needs.
Current efforts to amend the entities, which will continue apace
with the new tax context for the unincorporated entities, seem to exhibit both tendencies. However, our view is that the second trend, that
of reforming entity statutes to look like each other, seems to have
more strength. The newest revisions in partnership law, RUPA, and in
LLC statutes have both forms gravitating towards each other.
A.

Sole Proprietorship

In the past, a sole proprietor seeking limited liability would probably choose a corporation as the business vehicle. The taxation of the
76. If a business entity is organized under a statute which "describes or refers to
the entity as incorporated or as a corporation, body corporate, or body politic," the entity
will be characterized as a corporation for federal income tax purposes and the organizers
cannot elect to the contrary. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1996); id. § 301.7701-3(a).
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one-member LLCs was uncertain, 77 and a number of states did not
permit one-member LLCs as a matter of state law.78 Although the sole
proprietor/sole shareholder could elect S corporation status to achieve
some pass-through taxation benefits, the S corporation is less flexible
than a partnership from an income taxation standpoint.7 9 Moreover,
the creation of a separate corporate entity creates additional complications, such as compliance with state law corporate formalities and
wage withholding compliance burdens (including the payment of federal and state unemployment taxes).
The check-the-box regulations treat one-member LLCs as a nonentity for federal income tax purposes-essentially a sole proprietorship but with limited liability.8 0 With the income tax consequences of a
one-member LLC confirmed as those of a sole proprietorship, there are
few reasons, aside from the cost of forming and maintaining the entity,
not to form an LLC to limit the organizer's personal liability.8' This
factor should encourage more states to permit the formation of onemember LLCs. On the other hand, it will place a premium on LLC
statutes that will permit a simplified formation and management
structure to accommodate numbers of organizers who simply seek the
limited liability shield without further complications. 2 A recent quibble occupying the minds of some lawyers is, for example, whether a
one-member LLC can have an "operating agreement" which is defined
83
as an agreement signed among "members."
77. In Revenue Procedure 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501, 502, the Service stated that it
would not consider a ruling request on the status of a one-member LLC, and that an
LLC with fewer than two members would not be treated as a partnership for income tax
purposes. For articles discussing this topic, see Jerry S. Williford & Donald H. Standley,
How Should Single-Member LLCs Be Classified for Federal Tax Purposes?, 2 J. LimnTED
LIABILrrY CoiPANms 27 (1995); Francis J. Wirtz & Kenneth L. Harris, Tax Classification
of the One-Member Limited Liability Company, 59 TAX NOTEs 1829 (1993).
78. Single-member LLCs are permitted under state law in several states. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-631 (West Supp. 1996); ARu CODE ANN. § 4-32-201 (Michie
1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17050(a) (Deering 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-203
(West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(a) (Supp. 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co.
LAW § 203(a) (McKinney 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.044 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48203-102(a) (1995); TEx REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 3.01 (West Supp. 1997).
79. For a discussion of how the S corporation is less flexible than a partnership,
see infra note 109.
80. For a discussion of the check-the-box regulations, see supra note 17.
81. This is particularly true if the sole proprietor has employees who would subject
him or her to vicarious liability for their tortious behavior during the course of their employment. Of course, the sole proprietor would remain exposed to liability arising from
his or her own acts or omissions.
82. Filing the LLC papers just to attain limited liability would be unnecessary if
limited liability were the default state of affairs. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation
of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-25, 475
(1992) (discussing the current regulatory costs of achieving limited liability status, and
suggesting that "in the long run limited liability might come to be regarded as the
residual business form, with individual liability reserved for firms that make special
filings").
83. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, The Single-Member LLC: Operating Agreement
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B. General Partnership
In some respects the general partnership is not a "planned" entity
because it often arises in very informal circumstances or situations
where the participants are unaware of the type of legal relationship
that they share. One of the general partnership's principal drawbacks,
unlimited liability, has been addressed to varying degrees, but not
completely, by LLP amendments.M Significantly, the LLP form is not
available to those participants who fall into a partnership
with a
85
handshake deal; limited liability requires registration.
Even if the limited liability weakness is adequately met by future
amendments to partnership statutes, other aspects of the general partnership may be viewed as less than desirable. It is beyond the scope of
this article to discuss all of the perceived failings of the partnership, so
our treatment will be brief.86 First, due to the apparent authority that
each partner wields, it is more difficult to constrain the activities of
participants, although this has been addressed to some degree by
RUPA in its concept of a statement of partnership authority.87 Second,
the ability of the partners to determine contractually the boundaries of
their fiduciary duties to one another is less flexible than other entities,
such as the LLC, particularly under RUPA. 88 Third, the partnership
choice-of-law provisions are less predictable than those applicable to
corporations or LLCs. 9 Fourth, the power (as opposed to the right) of
Questions and Other Issues, 3 J. LIAITED LIABILITY Cotimms 87, 87-89 (1996); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Loneliest Number: The UnincorporatedLimited Liability Sole Proprietorship, J. ASSET PROTECTION, May-June 1996, at 46, 47-48.
84. Some of the LLP statutes provide protection by eliminating vicarious liability
for the professional malpractice of co-partners, while others protect against both contract
claims (eg., trade creditors, landlords) and tort claims. See Keatinge et al., supra note
21, at 174-80. The interstate validity of the limited liability shield is potentially called
into question in non-adopting states, of which there are now less than five, and those
states in which the LLP legislation provides for more circumscribed protection. Some
states permit only professionals to form LLPs. See, e.g., James L. Dam, Should Clients
Be LLCs or LLPs?, LAw. WKLY. USA, July 15, 1996, at 1 (comparing state LLP statutes
on a basis of whether the statute protects against both tort and contract claims). For a
categorization of states based on the level of protection provided by their LLP statutes,
see Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities,
32 WAFE FOREST L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1997).
85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-144 (Supp. 1996) (stating LLP registration
requirements).
86. For an appraisal of the shortcomings of the LLP, see Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for UnincorporatedFirms, 64 U. Cn. L. REv. 319, 327-40 (1996).
87. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSIIP ACT (RUPA) § 303, 6 U.L.A. 39 (1995).
88. For some of the scholarly literature debating the fiduciary duty and other aspects of the revised partnership Act, see J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA:
An Inquiry into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29 (1995); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW.
45 (1993); Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response to Professor Hynes, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (1995).
89. The revised Act states that the "law of the jurisdiction in which a partnership
has its chief executive office governs relations among the partners and between the part-
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partners to dissociate cannot be restrained. 90 Fifth, if comparisons are
made with a single-shareholder corporation or a single-member LLC, 91
the availability of a general partnership, with or without LLP provisions, is limited by the requirement of two or more partners.
Although the general partnership has its drawbacks, even a unified business entity proposal would not displace all partnerships because the general partnership is often a default vehicle for associates
who do not appreciate the existence of that legal relation. There needs
to be some default set of rules for these persons, and the general partnership serves that purpose. Accordingly, elimination of this form of
organization would not be necessary, or desirable, for the adoption of a
unified business organization statute.
A thought-provoking proposal is to give limited liability, by statute, to orally formed business associations (unregistered partnerships).92 As much as the legal system seems to favor limited liability
for small business participants, this may be pushing the envelope a bit
too far, even for its more zealous advocates. Yet why should registration be so crucial? If all partnerships were generally understood to
have limited liability as a default rule, an argument based on the need
for notice seems to be the question. 93 In that regard, based on federal
ners and the partnership." REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RUPA) § 106, 6 U.L.A. 25

(1995). The section comment states that the partners may agree to apply the law of another state, but that choice may not be respected if the partners or partnership do not
have a substantial relationship to the state or if application of the chosen law would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than
the state of choice. Id. § 106 cmt., 6 U.L.A. 25. For a criticism of the provision, see Alan
W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the FiduciaryDuties of Partners Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 79 IOWA L. REV. 219 (1994).
90. See REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RUPA) § 103(b)(6), 6 U.L.A. 16-17 (stating
that the "partnership agreement may not vary the power to dissociate as a partner").
91. Uncertainty concerning the income tax classification of one-member LLCs was
eliminated by the check-the-box regulations, which permit an election to be treated as a
corporation or as a non-entity, akin to a sole proprietorship with limited liability. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2) (1996).
92. Professor Ribstein has suggested that limited liability could be the default
state of affairs. See Ribstein, supra note 82, at 474-75.
93. To be consistent, it would seem that limited liability, without registration,
would also need to be extended to sole proprietors. At first blush, it would seem that a
natural pressure point would be created-whether the person was acting in a business
capacity (thereby entitled to immunity) or strictly in a personal matter. Cf UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (UPA) § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 256 (1995) (partnerships must be formed for a business purpose); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RUPA) § 202(a), 6 U.L.A. 27 (1995)
(partnerships must be formed for a business purpose); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 3.01(a) (providing that every corporation has the "purpose of engaging in any lawful
business"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (1991) (stating that a corporation may be incorporated or organized "to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes").
With respect to tort actions, the distinction between personal and business affairs
for an orally created business association could be largely irrelevant since the "sole proprietor" could be the sole actor, liable for any damages aside from entity considerations.
However, with respect to contractual liabilities, the differences could be enormous.
One might argue that the same potential exists under the current system-it just
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income tax return filing statistics, the number of sole proprietors who
have not adopted a limited liability form of business remains very
9 4

significant.

C. Limited Partnership
The limited partnership shares some of the drawbacks of the general partnership. Subject to the adoption of an LLP status for the general partner or the creation of a corporate general partner (with the
added expense and complexity that entails) the limited partnership
does not offer simple limited liability for all participants. In that regard, although the risk is minimal in states adopting the 1985 RULPA
amendments, the limited partners are subject to some risk for personal
liability if they participate in control of the partnership. 5 Ready dissolubility is still a problem with respect to the general partner, but that
can be mitigated through the use of a corporate general partner and
multiple general partners who have the power to continue the partnership. Apparently, the somewhat inflexible fiduciary duties of partnership law would apply to the general partner's dealings with the limited
96
partnership.
The limited partnership does offer some advantages. First, limited
partners are given voting and participation rights only on an opt-in
takes more paper. That is, one could contract for personal goods or services using a limited liability entity, like a corporation under the current system. Some impediments do
exist to the personal use of a limited liability entity, such as the treatment of the contributions and expenditures under federal tax law and, as noted above, any state law requirements of a business purpose.
94. During 1993, there were 706,537 new business incorporations. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 551
(115th ed. 1995). In 1992, the number of federal income tax returns filed for businesses
was: nonfarm sole proprietorships-15,495,000; partnerships-1,485,000 (this would include general and limited partnerships and LLCs); S corporations-,785,000; and other
corporations-2,084,000. Id. at 544.
95. The 1985 amendments to RULPA expanded the number of safe harbors for limited partner participation, including any "matters related to the business of the limited
partnership not otherwise enumerated ... which the partnership agreement states in
writing may be subject to the approval or disapproval of limited partners." REVISED UNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA) § 303(b)(6)(ix), 6A U.L.A. 145 (1995). Language was also
added to RULPA providing for limited partner liability "only to persons who ... reasonably believe, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner." Id. § 303(a), 6A U.L.A. 144. In Colorado, a literal reading of the LLP
amendments suggests that a limited partner could still be liable under section 303 of
RULPA, even though the general partners have no liability. Compare COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-62-403(2) (Supp. 1996) (stating the liabilities of a general partner), with id. § 7-62303(1) (1986) (explaining a limited partner's liability to third parties).
96. "Except as provided in this [Act] or in the partnership agreement, a general
partner of a limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited partners." REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA) § 403(a), 6A U.L.A. 177. "A general partner shall have all the
rights and powers and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a
partnership without limited partners...." UNiF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (ULPA) § 9(1),
6A U.L.A. 346 (1995).
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basis; 97 they start with essentially nothing. This provides a clear-cut
rule that scriveners and organizers can grasp. However, the entity is
flexible in substantial degree, and the partnership agreement can delineate the types and manners of limited partner participation. Quick
assumptions on the power of limited partners in any given organization, without careful reference to the partnership agreement, are more
likely to be false than accurate. Second, unlike the corporation and
perhaps the LLC, there apparently is no "piercing the veil" doctrine
applied to limited partners. The area has been occupied by fixing liability for participating in control9" and for incomplete registration.
Third, some argue that an LLP has tax advantages in comparison with
the LLC, in terms of wealth transfer tax valuation99 and the selfemployment tax. 100 Finally, some anomalies of state taxation create
random preferences.1 0'
Some knowledgeable practitioners wonder why anyone would use
LLPs instead of LLCs in non-estate planning contexts when LLCs provide such a convenient, flexible alternative. The data on registrations
may support their observation; limited partnership filings have de10 2
clined somewhat recently while LLC filings have increased steadily.
97. REVISED UNiF.LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA) § 405, 6A U.L.A. 201.
98. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 6, at 402-03 (discussing "piercing" in the context
of the limited partnership and LLC).
99. It is often observed that limited partnerships might provide better valuation
discounts than similarly situated LLCs: "There are, however, situations where a limited
partnership will continue to be more attractive-for example, limited partnership interests are more likely to qualify for significant valuation discounts under current gift and
estate tax rules." Joseph B. Darby, III, The Business Vehicle for the 21st Century, HEI isPHERES, June 1996, at 37, 40. "Without any case law support and history, it seems reckless at best to trade known valuation treatment for speculative valuation treatment." D.
John Thornton & Gregory A. Byron, Valuation of Family Limited PartnershipInterests,
32 IDAHo L. REV.345, 380 (1996). For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.E.
100. The distributive share of income of a "limited partner" is excluded from selfemployment earnings. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13) (1994). Status as a limited partner under
state law presumably qualifies for the exclusion. With respect to LLCs, the IRS has proposed regulations which would treat an LLC member as a "limited partner" for purposes
of the exclusion if:
(1) the member is not a manager of the LLC; (2) the entity could
have been formed as a limited partnership rather than an LLC in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the member could have qualified as a limited partner in that limited partnership
under applicable law. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-18, 59 Fed. Reg. 67,253, 67,254
(1994). An IRS official has reportedly stated that the proposed regulation could be revamped to look at factors other than participation in management and to deal more
broadly with the concept of "limited partner" in other contexts outside of LLCs, including
business trusts. Joan Pryde, IRS Looking to Revamp Regulations on Self-Employment
Tax Treatment of LLCs, 1996 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at G-2, G-2 to G-3 (June 6,
1996).
101. In Florida, an LLC is subject to the corporate income tax, but a limited partnership is not. See FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 608.471, 220.03(1)(e) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). In
Texas, an LLC is subject to the corporate franchise tax, while a limited partnership is
not. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(2) (West 1992). In Pennsylvania, an LLC is
taxed as a corporation unless a state S election is made or the "restricted professional
company" exception applies. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8925(a), 8997(b) (West 1995).
102. As of October 4, 1996, there were 110,048 domestic Colorado for-profit corpo-
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Limited Liability Company

The continuing revisions of the LLC led many to view the LLC as
the form with the most promise. Because the LLC has been recognized
in all fifty states, there is no longer any doubt that a foreign LLC will
be recognized in any given state and that, under the internal affairs
doctrine, place of formation law will be, for the most part, respected
(aside from the reception of one-member LLCs in states which do not
permit their formation). But most current versions of the LLC still
have some problems, particularly when viewed in the check-the-box
environment.
The LLC suffers from easy dissolubility, 10 3 an attribute which
probably would not be desired by most organizers. 0 4 New versions of
the statute will undoubtedly change this, as drafters originally designed the dissolution provisions to satisfy now obsolete federal tax
rules. 05 In some states the members' power to define freely the scope
of applicable fiduciary duties has been limited. 0 6 The change in the
tax rules ought not to affect these provisions. In other states, notably
Minnesota, the LLC legislation has been cluttered by corporate code
rations in good standing; 11,963 domestic limited partnerships; 420 limited liability limited partnerships; 1015 limited liability partnerships; and 19,433 domestic limited liability companies. Telephone interview with staff at the office of Victoria Buckley, Colorado
Secretary of State (Oct. 4, 1996). The numbers demonstrate a dramatic increase in the
number of LLCs and a slight increase in the number of LPs. In that regard, as of January 4, 1993 there were 1599 LLCs registered in Colorado. Tom Locke, LLC Numbers
Soar in State as Rules Eased, DENV. BUS. J., Jan. 14, 1994, § 1, at 3. As of January 5,
1994, the number of LLCs had increased to 4388, and the number of limited partnerships stood at 10,514. Id. In Texas, on the other hand, the differences are not so dramatic. New incorporations decreased from 38,135 in 1995 to 35,474 in 1996. Robert
Hamilton, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships(posted Sept. 19, 1996) <httpJ/
www.jextra.com/mailinglists/lnet-llc11464.html>. New LLC filings increased from 5163 in
1995 to 5549 in 1996, while new limited partnership filings also increased from 6936 in
1995 to 7394 in 1996. Id. This surprising appetite for limited partnerships could be explained by the Texas franchise tax that is imposed on LLCs but not on limited partnerships. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(2).
103. To assure limited life for federal income tax classification purposes, most LLC
statutes, as a default matter, provide for dissolution of the LLC upon classic partnership
dissociative events like the death of a member. See, e.g., )DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18801(4) (Supp. 1996) (dissolving an LLC upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member, unless the business of the LLC is continued by the consent of all the remaining members within 90 days following the event);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-801(c) (Supp. 1996) (resembling the Delaware provision's
language).
104. This is our assumption. Academics, however, view ready dissolubility as a desirable default result because it avoids the potential lock-in effect often associated with
the closely held corporation. See infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
105. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws reportedly
has proposed amendments to the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act that would
eliminate the dissolution of the LLC upon a member's withdrawal. See Estate Planning
Alert!, 4 LnuITED LLABILITY CoiuANY REP. 501 (1996).
106. See Gazur, supra note 18, at 149-56 (discussing state LLC statute treatments
of fiduciary duties).
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detail. 10 1 A state-by-state critique of LLC law is beyond the scope of
this article, but we address general guidelines in Part IV of this
article.
To the extent that the LLC is underused, it is probably attributable to the reluctance of users and their lawyers to use the new legal
entity, without a full file drawer of forms (operating agreements and

organizational/constitutional documents). 0 8 If limited liability is available for more familiar entities, such as partnerships, limited partnerships, and S corporations, then why should they spend time learning
the ropes on a novel entity? Especially since, to some degree, novelty
implies that users will accept some risk until the law on LLCs
matures.
E.

Close Corporation

A close corporation, as formed by many organizers, is perhaps the
simplest entity other than a "handshake" general partnership. The organizational documents are stylized, with a long pedigree, and well
understood. In Colorado, for example, one can form a corporation with
a one-page articles of incorporation supplied by the Secretary of State.
That is not to say that these organizations are well-structured; the
simplicity is obtained by overlooking or foregoing otherwise desirable
documents like shareholder voting agreements, formal employment
contracts, and agreements such as buy-sell arrangements, which provide some mechanisms for the orderly exit of shareholders. In addition
to the low-cost simplicity of the close corporation, it also opens the
door to S corporation status. In limited cases, organizers may prefer
tax rules applicable to S corporations, rather than those governing
partnerships, particularly in terms of avoiding self-employment
taxes.0 9 However, a recent IRS pronouncement, permitting an S corpo107. The Minnesota statute contains almost 150 sections and (with comments) occupies almost 200 pages of the Minnesota Statutes Annotated. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§8 322B.01 to .960 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
108. See, e-g., Committee on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of
the Bar of the City of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 527, 573
(1995) (explaining that lawyers do not use LLCs as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) because they are unfamiliar with the structure).
109. The S corporation is generally considered less flexible than a partnership.
Briefly, special allocations of items or income, gain, loss, deduction or credit are not permitted. I.R.C. § 1377 (1994). Unlike a partner, a shareholder does not increase personal
basis for entity level debt. Id. § 1366(d). Even with recent liberalization, an S corporation cannot have more than 75 shareholders, more than one class of stock, or shareholders who are nonresident aliens. 26 U.S.C.S. § 1361(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996). On the benefits
side of the ledger, the S corporation is not subject to the Internal Revenue Code § 704(c)
rules that require allocations of pre-contribution gain or loss on the disposition of property by the partnership. I.R.C. § 1377. Also, losses on the worthlessness of S corporation
stock are eligible for "ordinary loss" treatment. Id. § 1244. Furthermore, if public trading
is desired or reorganization with another corporation under Internal Revenue Code
§ 368 is planned, the assets are already in corporate solution. Finally, and this is a big
factor for some small business owners, S corporation undistributed profits or dividends
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ration election by an LLC, has confirmed that a state law "corporation"
is not the only avenue to S corporation status. 110
While close corporation statutes attempt to permit close corporations to function like partnerships, the relationship is not fully contractual and vestiges of now largely obsolete mandatory prescriptions
remain."' Interestingly, close corporation statutes are not updated and
modernized with anything close to the zeal that identifies those concerned with the minutiae of general corporate codes. 1 2 This creates a
system which does not work particularly well for anyone. On the one
hand, several significant provisions are not intuitive for the unsophisticated organizer. The greatest surprises for those who use close corporation statutes without a careful evaluation of their provisions are
those that lie in the provisions controlling the exit of dissatisfied participants. On the other hand, for the sophisticated organizers using
general incorporation statutes, the courts will not always defer to their
agreements, injecting uncertainty and opportunistic behavior into the
business relationship."' Arguably, a simpler, more forthright and flexible alternative is desirable." 4
are not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. For a discussion of these aspects
of the S corporation, see Gazur & Goff, supra note 6, at 454-57. See also Mark P. Altieri,
Considerations in Determining Whether to Elect S Corporationor LLC Status, 27 TAX
ADVISER 547, 548-52 (1996). The number of S corporation returns increased from 826,000
in 1986, to 1,785,000 in 1992, while the number of other corporate returns decreased
from 2,603,000 in 1986, to 2,084,000 in 1992. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 94, at 547. This could reflect the desire for pass-through income tax
treatment following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085-963
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). However, the number of partnership returns steadily declined from 1,703,000 in 1986, to 1,485,000 in 1992. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COAMERCE, supra note 94, at 547. This could be explained
by the decline of the tax shelter industry following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In that
regard, the number of partnership returns reporting net income remained roughly constant over the period: 851,000 in 1986, and 856,000 in 1992. Id. Over the same periods,
the number without net income decreased from 852,000 in 1986, to 629,000 in 1992. Id.
110. A recent private letter ruling suggests that taxpayers could be switching from
S corporation "corporations" to LLCs treated as corporations to enjoy the greater state
law flexibility of the latter entity. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-36-007 (Sept. 6, 1996). In this ruling,
the S corporation reorganized into an LLC that had been structured to gain classification as a corporation, which in turn elected S corporation status, to avoid a tax on the
liquidation of the corporation. Id.
111. Tara J. Wortman, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited Liability Companies and the
Key to Underutilizationof Close CorporationStatutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362, 1366-67
(1995). There is abundant scholarship discussing the apparent lack of enthusiasm for
close corporation statutes in the relatively few states that have enacted separate statutory regimes or supplements. See, eg., id. at 1362-65.
112. Delaware's general corporations law is now routinely fine-tuned with amendments every year. On the other hand, the Delaware Close Corporation Statute still requires that the corporation have no more than 30 shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 342(a)(1) (1991). This would frustrate the 35-shareholder (now 75-shareholder) limit
for S corporation status, presumably serving an important clientele. 26 U.S.C.S.
§ 1361(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996).
113. See Oesterle, supra note 11, at 910.
114. One commentator has predicted that the LLC, after check-the-box, will in-
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Miscellaneous Entities

The above discussion is not exhaustive, and there are other entities with their proponents. Colorado, for example, has the limited partnership association that essentially operates as a close corporation
statute for family estate planning purposes, responding to valuation
drawbacks of the LLC and limited partnership. 115 As of October 1,
1996, almost sixteen months after the effective date of the limited
partnership association statute, only eighteen have been formed in
16
Colorado."
Delaware and, in turn, Wyoming have enacted statutory trust
statutes that apparently are somewhat popular in creating passive investor units for asset-backed financings in a flexible environment with
entity continuity of life. 1 7 It is too early to predict the extent to which
creasingly displace corporations: "This [check-the-box] will very shortly cause LLC's to
knock out corporations for closely-held businesses,' says Stuart Levine of Baltimore, who
chairs an ABA committee on the new regulations." Corey E. Fleming, LLC's Get Enormous Boost, LAW. WKLY. U.S.A., May 20, 1996, at 1.
115. For a discussion of the special wealth transfer tax valuation provisions of
Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code, see infra Part III.E.
116. Telephone interview with staff at the office of Victoria Buckley, Colorado Secretary of State (Oct. 3, 1996).
117. For a general discussion of these statutes, see Oesterle, supra note 11, at 91417. A review (admittedly potentially misleading) of the names of over 1200 business
trusts listed with the Delaware Secretary of State as of July 28, 1995, as well as references in the LEXIS and WESTLAW legal and news databases, suggests a lot of activity
in asset-backed securities (including mortgages, loans, accounts receivable), asset leasing, and investment mutual finds. A presentation to the Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association confirmed that the trust could be used for collateralized bond
obligations, collateralized mortgage obligations, credit card and installment sale receivable trusts, royalty interest trusts, leveraged leasing arrangements, real estate investment trusts, and family-owned businesses. See James A. Florack & Martin I. Lubaroff,
The Best Entity for Doing the Deal, in DELAWARE BusINEss TRuSTS, at 371, 373 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7143, 1996). Speaking of the recently enacted Connecticut business trust statute, one commentator has noted that "[flor
large financings, a business trust makes a great deal of sense since it provides a set of
rules that would otherwise have to be spelled out in participation agreements." Irving S.
Schloss, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships (posted Oct. 31, 1996) <http'/
wv.ljextra.com/mailinglistsflnet-llc/1652.html>. The income classification of trusts is
largely left unchanged by the check-the-box regulations. Fleming, supra note 114, at 1.
Essentially, a trust will be taxed as a corporation if it has both associates and an objective to carry on a business for profit. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1996). Business
trusts will often be taxed as corporations, but they often are in turn eligible for special
tax regimes, applicable, for example, to real estate investment trusts and real estate
mortgage investment conduits. See also Florack & Lubaroff, supra, at 387-89 (discussing
possible treatment of a business trust as a grantor trust or as a partnership). A testamentary or inter vivos trust commonly encountered in estate administration usually will
be excluded from corporation status for the lack of "associates" because the beneficiaries
"do no more than accept the benefits thereof and are not the voluntary planners or creators of the trust arrangement" Id. § 301.7701-4(a). Many trusts will also avoid corporation status for the lack of a profit objective because they protect and conserve the assets
in a passive manner, rather than engaging in a business activity. Compare Rev. Rul. 7977, 1979-1 C.B. 448 (classifying a trust holding a commercial building as a trust), with
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the broadened Colorado cooperative statute will be utilized outside the
traditional agricultural and commodity-based contexts. 118
When one reaches the levels of specialization reflected in the miscellaneous statutes noted above, it is questionable whether a universal
entity proposal can, or really should, seek to accommodate those clienteles. It appears that while a universal entity can address the mainstream contexts, it cannot reach out beyond that.
III. THE

CASE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SMALL BusINEss ENTITY STATUTE

Now that the federal income tax classification thumb is largely removed from the scale, it is time to rethink the fundamental structure
of business associations seeking to distill the desirable aspects of the
welter of existing entity choices. The outright repeal of other statutory
business forms would not be a part of the proposal; practitioners and
business organizers would need a transition period in any event, and if
the new entity is ultimately better, the other forms should be driven
into disuse. A cynic may label our recommendation as adding to the
proliferation of forms. If history is any guide, this proposal is not the
last word, but just another transitional step on an unpredictable
path."

9

Opponents of statutes similar to our proposal, occasionally labeled
"unified entity" statutes, argue that they are not necessary and that no
constituency, other than academics, will support their passage. However, we find it ironic that the same folks also take the position that
current LLC statutes will eventually be amended to be more generic,
more corporate-like.' 20 Whatever the name, a more generic small busiRev. Rul. 78-371, 1978-2 C.B. 344 (classifying a trust to develop real estate as a corporation). However, in an opinion in which the Tax Court took great pains to limit to its special facts, a testamentary trust lacking "associates" yet operating an active business
barely avoided characterization as a corporation. Estate of Bedell v. Commissioner, 86
T.C. 1207, 1222 (1986), acq. in result, 1987-1 C.B. 1. If a trust is taxed as such, it is subject to a modified conduit treatment that taxes the beneficiaries on most distributions of
income (subject, of course, to several exceptions) and taxes the trust on undistributed income. See I.R.C. §§ 641-683 (1994). Trust income tax treatment can be less desirable
than pass-through treatment if income is accumulated in the trust because the trust and
estate income tax rates are very compressed, with income in excess of $7500 being subject to a 39.6% marginal income tax rate. See id. § 1(e) (the $7500 statutory threshold is
somewhat higher due to the application of an annual inflation adjustment).
118. For a discussion of the Colorado cooperative statute, see supra note 10.
119. The unpredictability in this area is startling. Even in 1990 there were few
people who would have considered 50 states with LLC legislation by 1996 as a real possibility. The rapid development of tax law, ending with the check-the-box regulations,
which essentially discard 40 years of partnership characterization law, is also stunning.
120. In a recent Internet symposium on the LLC, Professor Bernard Black, for example, observed that: "[T]here will be no political pressure to repeal old statutes-no one
will care... [T]here will thus be costs to repeal and no benefits (none that a politician
is likely to care about anyway--only us academics care about logic and symmetry and
such)." Bernard Black, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships (posted Sept. 12,
1996) <http://www.jextra.com/mailinglists/lnet-llc/1362.html>. Professor Black later suggested that, "[ilf Congress retains the purely formal distinction between nonpublic enti-
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ness form statute is needed without a preoccupation towards one section of the Internal Revenue Code.
The argument for a small business "limited liability entity" statute
is set out in steps below.
A.

Do We Need One Set of Default Rules or Several?

It is well-settled that any statutory regime creating and defining a
business entity should, to the greatest degree possible, reflect a structure that would be the common denominator in the largest number of
agreements by parties forming firms. This is assuming that those parties were left to their own devices to contract specifically to create a
business form, without significant transaction costs. The degree of consensus in this admittedly hypothetical inquiry affects not only the
number of sets of default rules needed, but the character of individual
rules in any given set.
Measuring degrees of consensus among firms on issues of internal
organizational structure will produce a continuum of results, which we
have broken down into three major categories. On some matters there
will be substantial agreement (Category One), other issues may have a
scant majority in accord (Category Two). On other questions there may
be little or no agreement (Category Three). In the simplest system,
with one set of rules, rules on Category One matters are most likely to
122
be mandatory 121 or perhaps discretionary but difficult to amend.
Rules on Category Two issues are most likely to represent the majority
view, with those in dissent given license to modify them. Finally, Category Three questions are likely to be left entirely to the parties' specific agreement. In Category Three, default rules may exist but mainly
to encourage the parties to elect specifically around them. Default
rules in Category Three also serve to ease the judicial burden of formulating a term in individual cases when the parties themselves have
an incomplete agreement.
The larger the number of rules in Category One and, to a lesser
extent, Category Two, the lower the cost to the parties of forming a
firm. Those who wish to contract around Category Three default rules
and the dissenters to Category Two must expend the costs of contracting specifically for their own needs, incurring the drafting costs
ties that are called corporations, and those that are not, states will amend LLC laws to
provide corporation law look-alikes." Id.
121. One could ask why Category One rules should not also be amendable by
agreement if parties would not choose to do it very often. A response is that mandatory
rules have significant "lock-in" benefits. They enhance the parties ex ante commitment
to an agreed provision. Of course, "mandatory" rules in one statutory set, when several
sets are available, are themselves discretionary because participants can elect an alternate system.
122. These conclusions are complicated by the fact that some rules are rules on
amendment or change. A Category Two rule on substance could be supplemented by a
Category One rule on ease of amendment. Unfortunately, this lively matter is beyond
the scope of the paper.
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and a higher potential for error since judges are more likely to misun123
derstand and misapply their basic agreement.
The creation of separate sets of rules is appropriate if the parties
can be subgrouped so that, under two systems of rules instead of one,
parties electing one form or the other increase the coverage of Categories One and Two and decrease Category Three. At this stage one
could wonder, why not favor twenty or thirty sets of rules? We could
minimize Category Three drafting costs by creating legal entities for
any substantial subgroup not perfectly, or near perfectly, served by the
existing rules. 24 The answer is, of course, that there are costs to adding multiple entities.
There are political costs of convincing a state legislature to adopt
each new entity (which, perhaps, could be diminished somewhat by
state competition for optimal systems); there are costs in regulatory
confusion (governments must work each entity into a plethora of regulatory systems); and there are costs in application as lawyers and clients struggle to assess accurately and apply the correct form. A multiplication of forms would have the odd effect of undoing the nineteenth
century move by states from individual incorporation to incorporation
provisions for industries (utilities, bridges, etc.) to general incorporation statutes. 125 The same reasons that led states to move from industry-specific incorporation statutes to general incorporation statutes
should retard the multiplication of small business forms.
An understated cost of our present system, which has at one time
had a multiplicity of forms, and forms that are malleable enough to allow users to replicate one form within another, is the confusion and
correlative opportunity for fraud effected on passive or minority investors who join small enterprises, often without legal counsel. There is
no longer a basic meaning to the titles of businesses. A general partnership gave more rights ("protections") than a "close" corporation,
which gave more rights than a corporation. Now, what rights in this
queue does a "company" or a "partnership association" provide? Ask a
26
lawyer.
Moreover, even given a lawyer's general understanding, each entity can be individually modified to negate that understanding. Any organization, taking full advantage of liberalizing opt-out rules, can produce a considerable surprise for passive or minority investors who do
123. Courts may not understand or simply refuse to enforce their agreement.
124. This is not the "Chinese Menu" approach, in which one can select from a vast
universe of alternate separate provisions, criticized by Professor Ribstein. See Larry E.
Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 381-82 (1995). The difference being that, although there would be numerous entity alternatives, each would represent a coherent system.
125. See Dale A. Oesterle, Formative Contributionsto American Corporate Law by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1810, in THE HISTORY OF THE
LAW IN MASSACHUSErrs: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992, 127 (Russell Osgood
ed., 1992) (discussing early corporations in New England).
126. The lawyer should be a specialist.
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not get advice on the particulars of the entity in which they are investing. Hire a lawyer. If it is possible, we ought to minimize this element
of surprise.
Applying the theory to practice, most would agree that we could,
and largely do (although not with precision), group parties in publiclytraded firms separately from parties in privately-held firms, specifying
structural systems for each that are materially different. Publiclytraded firms must deal with substantial agency cost problems associated with capital accumulation from large pools of passive investors.
127
Privately-held firms do not.
However, the topic of the article is new non-corporate forms, and
privately-held firms are the dominant users of such forms. At issue is
whether additional division is appropriate in the subgrouping of privately-held firms. Can we get by with one "unified" unincorporated
business statute? Or do we need three or four or more sets of rules?
The new explosion in small business entities seems, at first glance, to
demand an affirmative answer to the latter question.
A single comprehensive form could either be too constraining (one
size does not fit all) or too flexible and vacuous so as to be devoid of
guidance, particularly for small businesses that will rely upon default
rules rather than elaborate written agreements. Professor Ribstein, for
example, has argued that an extremely flexible, so-called "Chinese
Menu" statutory approach, permitting organizers to choose from numerous alternate provisions, 128 is undesirable because the disparate
129
provisions may not form a coherent set of terms.
But, as we have suggested earlier, the strength of the demand for
a multiplicity of entities is easy to overestimate. Much of the need for
separate entities rests solely on titles, not the essence of the rules
within each system. 130 Perhaps all we need in our "unified" statute is
an election on title. Consider a provision that enables anyone registered under a single statute to elect any of the following entity titles:
corporation, company, or partnership. Such a provision may solve our
liquor licensing problem.' 3 ' Another method of achieving the same result, of course, is to have three or four separate statutes with largely
identical rules but different titles for businesses registered under each

127. For an argument that the division between publicly traded and privately held
companies is a more rational place to divide those firms that may choose flow-through
tax status from those that may not, see Richard A. Booth, The Limited Liability Company and the Search for a Bright Line Between Corporationsand Partnerships,32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 79 (1997).
128. See Ribstein, supra note 124, at 381.
129. We believe that subgroupings of default rules, as per our proposal below, answers his objection. See infra Part ILI.B.
130. For a discussion of factors related to title, and not organizational structure,
that influence choice of entity form, see supra Part I.B.2.
131. For a discussion of conflicts between liquor licensing laws and choice of business entity titles, see supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
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statute. Evidence for this argument, although admittedly weak, 132
comes from the movement of modern codes for LLCs, corporations, and
partnerships; these codes are gravitating toward each other in substantial respects and that trend should accelerate in a check-the-box
environment.
In any event, history suggests that we could minimize Category
Three 13 3 with several sets of rules for small businesses. The next issue
is how the several sets should be organized and presented within any
given state.
B. Methods of PresentingAlternative Sets of Default Rules
Most states have seven to nine separate entity statutes that the
organizers of a small business ought to consider, 34 as we have here in
Colorado, with some of the statutes borrowing from each other by express or implied incorporation by reference.3 5 Pennsylvania is considering a bold new system in which some rules, the "hub," apply to all
entities otherwise individually defined, the "spokes." 136 There are
seven spokes. 137 Decisions on which rules go in the hub and which
rules go in the spokes are critical and difficult. Pennsylvania, for example, has definitions of fiduciary duty (both the duty of care and loyalty), 38 permissible indemnification, 139 and mergers in which equity
participants lose limited liability protections, in the hub. 40 Which system is optimal?
Some readers may wonder at this point what all the fuss is about.
The previous section's question of how many sets of default rules are
optimal is significant and weighty, but the issue in this section is trivial. Why does it matter if we have four or five separate freestanding
sets of default rules, the hub and spoke system, or something in be132. The alternative explanation for the movement is that we are changing our
views of where the real differences among entities ought to lie. The evidence of gravitation is simply modernization.
133. For a discussion of the three categories for issues of organizational structure,
see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
134. For an example of entity choices in one state, see the Colorado statutes discussed supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
135. Limited partnership statutes, for example, borrow freely from general partnership statutes. See Larry E. Ribstein, Linking Statutory Forms, 58 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 187, 187-200 (1995) (discussing linkages between statutory forms for general and
limited partnerships). Professional corporation and close corporation statutes borrow
from general corporation statutes.
136. For an explanation of the Pennsylvania "hub and spoke" organization, see
supra note 30.
137. The "spokes" are for-profit corporations, not-for-profit corporations, general
partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, professional associations,
and business trusts. See S. 1506, 180th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 102 (listing and defining the
entity titles included in the bill).
138. Id. § 311.
139. Id. §§ 341-348.
140. Id. §§ 381-382.
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tween (our present system with its limited incorporation by reference)?
It has been said-to diminish the significance of the inquiry-that this
matter is just a "law professors' issue."141 Creating a "clean" structure
may occupy the time of academics, but does not mean much to users. 42
There seem to be some practical advantages, however, in choosing
one system over another. For example, in the Pennsylvania system,
rules in the hub may be difficult to change over time. And, as we have
seen, a system that relies on incorporation by reference always seems
to leave something out, imposing substantial "policing" costs on
users.'43 Finally, systems that rely on completely separate statutes,
with titles carefully assigned to each statute, create legal abnormalities if other regulatory systems do not keep up, leaving the newest entity titles out of their classification systems.1 44 However, how the practical advantages balance out is, at present, anybody's guess.
Our guess is detailed in Part IV. The essence of the proposal is a
single entity structure with three packages of default rules. Participants are asked to elect one of the three packages or craft their own.
Each package is consistent with a defining philosophy. We offer this
structure based on two advantages over either the hub and spoke or
the freestanding system. First, we hope that it will minimize problems
with title in collateral regulatory systems. Each of the three options is
titled an "entity" and registered as an entity with state officials. Second, we hope that it will minimize the confusion of parties who are not
legally sophisticated, and in doing so, it will also minimize the opportunities for deceit. With partnerships looking like corporations, and
some corporations looking like partnerships, and "companies" no longer
a synonym for a corporation, an investor who invests in a "partnership" or a "company" or even a "corporation" can no longer rely on an
intuitive sense of what rights go with the name. By asking promoters
to choose among default rule packages and requiring an accurate disclosure of which package has been chosen, perhaps we can return
some degree of accuracy to a more intuitive view of unincorporated
associations.
C. Isolating Non-Tax Threads in the Current New Entity Movement
With the admitted accuracy of reading tea leaves, we need to attempt to filter the tax from the non-tax influences in the new entity
141. See Black, supra note 120.
142. Id.
143. See, ag., Hill v. Behrmann, 911 P.2d 679, 682-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that rules on corporations apply to mutual ditch companies formed under the turn of the
century Ditch Act; the companies were forgotten in the current revision of Colorado corporate code), cert. granted, 911 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1996). See generally Ribstein, supra note
135 (discussing unanswered issues raised by the linking of the general and limited partnership acts).
144. For a discussion of some of the problems created by gaps in regulatory statutes, see supra text accompanying notes 52-72.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

movement. We find, with large room for disagreement on several of the
points, the following. Most, if not all, organizers of small business entities want limited liability145 in whatever entity they choose. Most organizers do not want whatever entity they choose to dissolve automatically on the death or incapacity of a manager or investor.146 And most
organizers want prohibitions on theft of entity assets by insiders. Theft
is defined to include, in addition to unauthorized taking of entity assets for personal use: first, sweetheart transactions between the entity
and insiders (conflict of interest transactions); second, the usurping of
entity business opportunities for personal gain; and, third, the waste of
entity assets through disproportionate and excessive grants of salary
and perquisites or on favored personal causes. Admittedly, the agony
is in the details; much of the discourse in partnership, corporate, and
LLC law is aimed at delineating the boundaries of "theft." Finally,
most organizers want to give individual investors some recourse
against managers for reprehensibly poor performance (reckless or intentionally inept performance), other than by a vote for ouster.
Beyond these three primary principles, organizers' desires seem to
divide into major groups. We suggest the following subgroupings as
most appropriate, recognizing that other subgrouping can be argued
with equal force. In Group One, all equity investors, usually a small
number, are active participants in the business. In Group Two, some of
the equity investors are passive and the passive investors expect some
substantial additional protections from majority control of the business
by insiders. In Group Three, a substantial number of the equity investors are passive and, as sophisticated passive investors, do not want or
need protections from majority control in addition to the basic rules
against theft and reckless performance and their ability to demand
firm-specific covenants.
Investors in Group One want management rights and protections
from exclusion from management without cause; those in Groups Two
and Three want some say in the selection of managers. Investors in
Group Two also want some form of exit right (either automatic or contingent) or outside intervention (judge or arbitrator) in cases of majority oppression. Organizers in Group Three have the greatest latitude
in fashioning their own internal structure. The structure for each
group is fleshed out in Part IV below.
The evidence for the need for Group One comes from the popularity of partnerships and now limited liability partnerships, in which the
145. When tax characterization was an issue, however, the absence of limited liability was one factor weighing in favor of partnership characterization. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993) (replaced 1996) (listing six characteristics, including limited liability, considered when deciding whether an entity is a corporation for tax
purposes). Under the check-the-box regulations, limited liability is no longer a factor in
entity classification.
146. Many law professors would disagree. They see ready dissolubility as healthy
because it helps, or at least forces the parties to reckon with, the potential lock-in of minority investors in the closely held corporation. See infra note 210.
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default rule is for all partners to have management power. The model
is of two friends, or perhaps family members, who go into business together. The evidence for the need for Group Two is from oddly disparate sources. Some evidence comes from the organization of modern
high-tech enterprises in which venture capital firms commonly demand, in exchange for their contributions, a put option exercisable in
five years. Other evidence comes from those who, as friends, contribute
to a family business and who expect, and may be dismayed to find to
the contrary, that exit is an option on some terms if the relationship
sours. Evidence for the need for Group Three comes from the latest
statutes in the LLC movement and RUPA. The new statutes are increasingly open-ended, leaving the parties to contract for minimal judicial interference in their businesses. 147 Here, the norm is an organization with passive investors who are sophisticated business people.
D. The Case for a Small Business Entity Statute
Putting the thoughts in subsection C together with those in subsection B, we conclude that one small business entity statute with
three sets of default rules would be worth a try. All entities would be
labeled and registered as "limited liability entities," avoiding the current problem with titles. We would prefer to call Group One organizations "limited liability partnerships," Group Two organizations "close
companies," and Group Three organizations "private corporations."
However, our use of the terms could resuscitate the current obsession
with title in collateral regulatory systems. Our use of the term corporation, for example, would require corporate taxation characterization
under the check-the-box rules. 148 Other titles are required.
Organizers of a limited liability entity would be required to select
among the three sets of rules and notify all investors at the time of
their investments of the set chosen. Limits are needed on decisions to
move from one set of rules to another. For example, moving from one
set of rules to another (by amending the constitutional documents or
by merger) would require an investor vote of all participants if the organization started as a Group One type, of all minority participants if
the organization started as a Group Two type, and a majority of all investors if the organization started as a Group Three type. Again, some
of the details of this arrangement are fleshed out later in Part IV of
this article.
147. The highly flexible LLC adopted in some states is the leading example of free
contracting legislation. See Oesterle, supra note 11, at 900-14.
148. Under the check-the-box rules, companies organized under state "corporation"
statutes or statutes that refer to the entities as "corporations" are treated as corporations for federal income tax purposes; the entities cannot elect to be treated otherwise
(except for the S corporation election as a separate matter). See supra note 76. For an
argument that privately held corporations may eventually be allowed to "check the box"
as well, see Booth, supra note 127, at 78, 86.
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Nagging Residual Tax Issues: Estate Tax Planning

Unfortunately, the check-the-box regulations for federal income
tax classification do not eliminate the role of taxation in dictating the
structure of small business entities. In some cases, our effort to
rename small business entities as "limited liability entities" may help;
in others, it may not. The zaniest example comes from the federal
wealth transfer tax.
Since its enactment in 1990, estate planners have been fixated on
mitigating the impact of the special wealth transfer tax valuation provisions of Chapter 14 of Subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code
(Chapter 14).149 The four Internal Revenue Code sections150 contained
in Chapter 14 have produced a level of complexity and agonizing practitioner speculation with few rivals. 151
Some of the anxieties experienced by practitioners about the potential application of Chapter 14 to their estate planning vehicles apparently prompted some to contact their state legislators. The legislators responded with changes to familiar entities, like the limited
partnership, and the creation of new entities, like the limited partnership association, all designed to facilitate estate tax planning. If it
could be said that state legislatures demonstrated little concern for the
preservation of the federal income tax revenue base in quickly embrac-

149.

Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-491 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704

(1994)).

150. See I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (1994).
151. See, eg., Jerald David August, Artificial Valuation of Closely Held Interests:
Sea 2704, 22 EsT. PLAN. 339 (1995); Martin D. Begleiter, Estate Planning in the Nineties:
Friday the Thirteenth, Chapter 14: Jason Goes to Washington-PartI, 81 KY. L.J. 535
(1992-1993); Peter A. Borrok, Four Estate PlanningDevices to Get Excited About, N.Y.
ST. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 32; Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, m1,Family Limited Part.
nerships: Decanting Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127 (1995);
Bryan M. Dench, Business Valuation Tax Freezes After OBRA 1990, 7 ME. B.J. 238
(1992); Charles S. Grobe, The Family Discount Partnership Tax and Non Tax Advantages, 28 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 58 (1994); James R. Hamill, Personal Residence
Trusts Can Reduce Transfer Taxes, 55 TAX'N FOR AccT. 73 (1995); Louis S. Harrison, Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14 and Partnerships Can Save Transfer Taxes, 11 J.
PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 239 (1994); Louis S. Harrison, The Real Implications of the New
Transfer Tax Valuation Rules-Success or Failure?, 47 TAX LAW. 885 (1994); Louis S.
Harrison, Using a Multi-Class Corporationto Achieve Estate and Gift Tax Savings: Does
It Work After Chapter 14?, 44 SYRACUSE L. R.. 1153 (1993); Terrance A. Kline, Planning
Opportunities with Family Limited Partnerships, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1994, at 79; Louis A.
Mezzullo, New Estate Freeze Rules Replacing 2036(c) Expand Planning Potential, 74 J.
TAX'N 4 (1991); Lloyd Leva Plaine & Pam H. Schneider, Prop. Regs. on Valuing Rights
and RestrictionsFocus on Exceptions, 75 J. TAX'N 204 (1991); James R. Repetti, Minority
Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415 (1995); David S.
Rhine, Final Regs. on Chapter 14 Simplify Valuation Rules, 21 TAX'N FOR LAW. 150
(1992); Nancy Shurtz, Valuation Methods and Strategies Explained, 22 EST. PLAN. 126
(1995); Mark R. Siegel, The InternalRevenue Code's Assault on Buy- Sell Agreements, 54
LA. L. REv. 149 (1993); Wayne L. Warnken & Pamela R. Champine, Anti-Estate Freeze
Rules Can Have Wide Scope, 20 EST. PLAN. 220 (1993).
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ing the pass-through LLC, one could repeat that charge with respect to
the assault on the federal wealth transfer tax base.
In this section, we offer a simplified discussion of one subsection of
Chapter 14, Internal Revenue Code § 2704(b), and its impact on the
structure of limited partnerships and LLCs. We do not aim to educate
estate planners, but to make the point that important distinctions in
federal tax law ought not be tied to small business forms and titles.
The rationale for the check-the-box regulations in the federal income
tax code ought to be generalized in all tax law, and in particular to
wealth transfer tax law. We have such a proposal at the conclusion of
the section. But first, a discussion of the current mess.
The limited partnership and the LLC now play significant roles in
estate planning. Both vehicles can offer limited liability to the participants 152 and pass-through income tax treatment. 153 Aside from the
practical benefits of providing a vehicle to carry family business or investment assets from generation to generation, including ordering the
transition of family control of the entities and their underlying assets,
the use of the limited partnership or LLC can also produce wealth
transfer taxation benefits, principally in terms of the "valuation
game.' 54
Consider a client, age 65, with a net worth of $5,000,000, much of
which is represented by outright ownership of a family business, real
estate, or publicly traded stocks. Charitable gift arrangements are of
little interest. Continued lifetime gifts using the $10,000 annual gift
exclusion to shift present value and future appreciation, 15 5 life insurance, and other common estate reduction techniques do relatively little
to deal with appreciation already earned. However, converting outright
ownership of assets into other ownership structures can have an immediate depletion impact on valuation. Fractional interest discounts
are perhaps the simplest. Suppose that the client gives one-third of his
or her interest in Blackacre to the client's child. The client may argue
that the gift is valued at less than one-third of the overall value of
Blackacre. Moreover, upon the client's death, his or her estate may ar152. Of course, the general partner of a limited partnership would otherwise be
subject to liability unless a corporate general partner is utilized. The LLLP responds to
this issue by extending limited liability to the general partner. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text.
153. While the S corporation offers pass-through income tax treatment, I.R.C.
§ 1366 (1994), it is clumsy for estate planning because multiple classes of stock can differ only in voting rights, not with respect to dividend and liquidation rights and preferences. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(1) (1992). Moreover, being subject to overall corporate taxation rules still limits the flexibility in moving assets to and from the corporation without
income tax consequences. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 311 (1994) (attributing gain to the corporation on non-liquidating distributions of property); id. § 336 (attributing gain to the corporation on liquidating distributions of property).
154. See, e.g., Bryle M. Abbin, Is Valuation the Best PlanningCame Remaining?, in
PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATES 739, 760-62 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr.
22, 1996).
155. See I.R.C. § 2503(b).
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gue that the value of the estate's interest in Blackacre is less than
two-thirds of the overall value of Blackacre. Arguably, the value has
156
evaporated.
In a related theme, if the client gives minority interests in a family corporation, it may be argued that the gifted shares may be discounted for their lack of marketability and for their lack of control
over corporate matters (e.g., liquidation of the corporation, dividends
policy). 15 7 However, if the client wants to claim a discount for publicly

traded stocks, 158 wants to create a larger discount than the fractional
interest discount doctrine would supply, or wants to create illiquidity
or control discount possibilities beyond those provided by the extant
organizational structure of the family business enterprise, a new entity
may be required. Along those lines, the client would contribute the assets to a new "family" limited partnership or LLC. 159 Upon the gift of
limited partnership or LLC interests to family members, or upon the
death of the owner of such an interest, the donor or the estate of the
decedent, as the case may be, will typically assert that the value of the
156. See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1249-53 (9th Cir. 1982)
(granting a 15% discount on real estate); Estate of Pillsbury v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M.
(CCH) 284 (1992) (same). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-36-002 (May 28, 1993) (fractional
interest discount should not exceed the costs of a partition action). Although beyond the
scope of this article, the taxpayer must contend with IRS arguments that fractional discounts may be lost upon subsequent aggregation of the interests. See, e.g., Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 2044 does not require
QTIP assets to merge with other assets); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-08-001 (Aug. 18, 1995)
(holding that the decedent's partnership interests in the gross estate under § 2044 and
§ 2038 are to be aggregated); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-50-002 (Aug. 31, 1995) (holding that
stock in a closely held corporation that is included in the decedent's gross estate under
§ 2044 will be aggregated with stock owned outright by decedent); Tech, Adv. Mem. 9140-002 (Oct. 4, 1991).
157. See, e.g., Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 249 (1990) (stating
that it would be unreasonable to not apply a discount for a minority interest in a
closely-held corporation), nonacq., 1991-1 C.B. 1; Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 109
(1986) (holding that discounts for lack of control and marketability are necessary).
158. With a publicly traded stock, lack of marketability would not generally be an
issue, and the minority discount would be reflected in the market price. On the other
hand, with large blocks of even publicly traded stock, the taxpayer could be subject to a
control premium if practical control of the corporation is achieved, but he could claim a
blockage discount if placing the shares in the market at one time would depress the
market price. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e) (as amended in 1992) (blockage discount
rule). The use of family limited partnerships or LLCs to successfully reduce the estate
taxation value of publicly traded stocks is subject to some uncertainty, including technical matters such as avoiding "investment company" treatment under I.R.C. § 351(e) and
§ 721(b). See Michael D. Mulligan, Family Limited Partnerships,COMPLEAT LAW., Summer 1996, at 29. One practitioner recently reported that a family limited partnership
with 75% of the assets comprised of publicly traded securities claimed a 57% discount in
the estate tax return which was settled at audit with a 40% discount. Lynn Fowler, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships (posted Oct. 10, 1996) <http:ll
www.ljextra.com/mailinglists/lnet-llc/1568.html>.
159. A corporate structure, in some respects, offers better valuation discounts, but
it suffers from double taxation of income.
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interest should be discounted substantially for lack of marketability, il60
liquidity, and a minority lack of voting control.
The valuation discount in large part is produced because the taxpayer has exchanged outright ownership of an asset for an interest in
an entity that, while owning the asset, imposes more restrictions on
access to the contributed asset's value. Marketability will usually suffer; while there may be ready buyers for a fee simple absolute interest
in Blackacre, the same cannot be said for an interest in a family entity. Moreover, if the taxpayer owns only a minority interest in the entity, the taxpayer cannot control the timing of the distribution of profits generated from the underlying assets. Furthermore, the taxpayer
cannot readily receive, through liquidation of the enterprise, a proportionate share of its net assets. The last two claims are subject, however, to the family's power to waive or otherwise amend the restrictive
provisions whenever it suits their purposes. So the Internal Revenue
Code, principally in § 2703161 and § 2704,162 ignores certain valuedepressing restrictions imposed in the organizational documents of
"family" limited partnerships or LLCs. The latter section is particularly pertinent to the fundamental structure of business association
statutes.
Internal Revenue Code § 2704(b) provides that if a taxpayer transfers an interest in a corporation or partnership to (or for the benefit of)
a member of the transferor's family, 163 and the transferor and members of the transferor's family hold control 64 of the entity immediately
160. This assumes, of course, that if the estate of the decedent is to qualify for a
minority discount, lifetime gifts of interests to other family members would be required
to dissipate the control position. The wealth transfer valuation of closely held business
has been a popular topic, the details of which are beyond the scope of this article. See,
e.g., John A. Bogdanski, The Outer Limits of Minority Discounts, 23 EST. PLAN. 380
(1996); Thornton & Byron, supra note 99; Andrew J. Willms, Discounting Transfer Taxes
with LLCs and Family Limited Partnerships,13 J. TAx'N OF INVESTMENTS 210 (1996).
161. This section disregards, for valuation purposes, buy-sell agreements and options to purchase unless (1) the agreement is a bona fide business arrangement; (2) the
agreement is not a device to transfer such property to members of the decedents family
for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth; and (3) the
agreement's terms are comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in
an arms' length transaction. I.R.C. § 2703(b).
162. This section contains two themes. Subsection (a) treats as a taxable event (a
gift or an addition to a decedents taxable estate, as the case may be) the lapse of "voting
or liquidation rights" in a corporation or partnership. Id. § 2704. Subsection (b) ignores
the effect of restrictions on the ability of a corporation or partnership to liquidate. Id.
163. "Member of the family" means an individual's spouse, any ancestor or lineal
descendant of such individual or such individual's spouse (and any spouse of any individual so described), and any brother or sister of the individual (and any spouse of such
brother or sister). Id. § 2704(c)(2). Interests held indirectly through a corporation, partnership, trust or other entity are treated as owned by the individual holding the interest. Id. § 2701(e)(3).
164. "Control" in the case of a corporation means the holding of at least 50% (by
vote or value) of the stock of the corporation. See id. §§ 2704(c)(1), 2701(b)(2)(A). In the
case of a partnership, "control" means the holding of at least 50% of the capital or profits interest in the partnership, or in the case of a limited partnership, the holding of any
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before the transfer, any "applicable restriction" is disregarded in determining the value of the transferred interest. 165 An "applicable restriction" means any restriction which effectively limits the ability of the
corporation or partnership to liquidate and either: (1) the restriction
lapses in whole or in part after the transfer, or (2) the transferor or
any member of the transferor's family, alone or collectively, has the
right after such transfer to remove, in whole or in part, the restriction.166 If the transferor and his or her family do not control the entity
in question immediately prior to the transfer or if there is a right to
remove the restriction, it is deemed not held by the transferor or related parties. 67 In the context of a family estate planning vehicle,
where the absence of family control will often not be desirable from a
practical standpoint, 68 the focus has shifted to avoiding characterization as an "applicable restriction."
The Treasury regulations state that an applicable restriction is "a
limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part)
that is more restrictive than the limitations that would apply under
the State law generally applicable to the entity in the absence of the
restriction." 69 Consequently, one manner by which status as an "applicable restriction" apparently can be avoided is that the restriction be
that generally provided by state law (i.e., the default provision under
the relevant enabling statute). 170 Skirting § 2704(b) has produced a
great deal of discussion, 171 and the ultimate sweep of § 2704(b) is uncertain. Its apparent impact on limited partnerships and LLCs cannot

interest as a general partner. See id. §§ 2704(c)(1), 2701(b)(2)(B).
165. Id. § 2704(b).
166. Id. § 2704(b)(2). The term "applicable restriction" does not include any commercially reasonable restriction which arises as a part of any financing by the corporation or partnership with a person unrelated to the transferor, transferee, or a member of
the family of either, nor does it include any restriction imposed, or required to be imposed, by any federal or state law. Id. § 2704(b)(3).
167. Id. § 2704(b)(2)(B)(ii).
168. In conversations with estate planning practitioners, the authors have found
practitioners who do allow apparently unrelated parties (charitable organizations, one's
accountant, etc.) to hold the power to block the liquidation of the entity or a transfer of
interests. For a brief discussion of the perceived drawbacks to using charitable organizations and the potential for using lender-imposed restrictions and buy-sell agreements,
see Patricia A. Templar & Douglas M. Cain, FLPs for Family Asset Management and
Transfer Tax Planning,24 COLO. LAW. 1245, 1251-52 (1995).
169. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992).
170. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3)(B).
171. See, e.g., H. Bryan Ives, III, Valuation Discounts for Partnership and LLC
Member Interests, 1 J. L fnTED LIABILITY CoMPANms 110, 111 (1994); Larry E. Ribstein,
Statutory and Planning Considerationsfor Withdrawal from an LLC, 1 J. LaIUTED LIA.
BiLry CohNPA iEs 64, 69-70 (1994); Willms, supra note 160, at 215-16. One commentator

has suggested that even participant class distinctions created under an LLC agreement
(as contrasted with the prescribed limited and general partner classes of a limited partnership) "would be ignored by the application of Internal Revenue Code sections 2703
and 2704." Thornton & Byron, supra note 99, at 381.
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be generalized; one must examine the relevant state statute, and Colorado's response to § 2704 is a good example.
Prior to 1995 amendments, the Colorado limited partnership statute followed the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act language
which provided that, in the event the agreement was silent as to withdrawal, a limited partner could "withdraw upon not less than six
months' prior written notice to each general partner."172 The potential
§ 2704(b) problem is readily apparent; the "restriction" generally applicable under state law is a right to withdraw and consequently receive
the fair value of the partnership interest. 173 In 1995, the statute was
amended to modify the default language to read as follows: "A limited
partner may only withdraw from a limited partnership at the time or
upon the happening of events specified in writing in the partnership
agreement."' 74 Arguably, the default position for the purposes of
§ 2704(b) is that, in the absence of provisions in the partnership agreement, a limited partner has no right to withdraw from the partnership
at any time. A provision in the agreement permitting withdrawal on
certain terms would appear to be less restrictive, rather than more restrictive, than the default provision and therefore should not constitute
an "applicable restriction."
The Colorado LLC statute is a bit more confusing, reflecting the
absence of the sharp general partner/limited partner distinctions found
in the limited partnership statute. "Unless prohibited in a written operating agreement," a member may resign from an LLC at any time,
172. Id. The uniform Act states:
A limited partner may withdraw from a limited partnership at the time or
upon the happening of events specified in writing in the partnership agreement. If the agreement does not specify in writing the time or the events
upon the happening of which a limited partner may withdraw or a definite
time for the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership, a limited
partner may withdraw upon not less than six months' prior written notice to
each general partner at his [or her] address on the books of the limited partnership at its office in this State.
REVISED UNiw. LTD. PARTNERSHP AcT (RULPA) § 603, 6A U.L.A. 217-18 (1995). The Colorado statute generally followed the language of the uniform Act, with some minor modifications concerning the notices to general partners. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-62-603
(1986). Note that the language is disjunctive, that the limited partner may withdraw
only if there is neither a time or event specified for the withdrawal of a limited partner
nor a definite time for the dissolution and winding up of the partnership. Id. The argument was made that if the certificate of limited partnership provided a specific period of
existence, limited partner withdrawal was precluded and the set term was not an applicable restriction. See Ives, supra note 171, at 112-14. Whether the set term was required
by statute (and consequently not an applicable restriction) turned upon whether the
RULPA § 201(a)(4) certificate of limited partnership content was followed, requiring "the
latest date upon which the limited partnership is to dissolve Id. at 113.
173. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHiP ACT (RULPA) § 604, 6A U.L.A. 220. Upon
withdrawal, the withdrawing partner is entitled to receive any distribution provided in
the partnership agreement, and if not otherwise provided, the fair value of the limited
partnership interest. Id.
174. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-62-603 (Supp. 1996).
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but if the resignation violates the operating agreement, the LLC may
recover and offset damages. 175 It would seem that a restriction on withdrawal would constitute an "applicable restriction," assuming the other
factors (like family control) are present. 17 6 On the other hand, resignation from a Colorado LLC is ultimately somewhat illusory, because although one accordingly loses the status of "member" with the attendant voting rights and other privileges, the resigning member is not
7
entitled to the immediate return of the member's investment.1 7
The marketability discount is enhanced by the structure of the
limited partnership and LLC statutes that follow the "assignee" approach to transfers of partnership interests. For example, while limited
partner interests are, as a default matter, "assignable in whole or in
part"178 the transferee remains only an assignee unless the partnership
agreement authorizes the admission as a partner or all other partners
consent to such admission. 179 The LLC statute follows a similar pattern.6 0 The treatment of additional restrictions on transfers, such as
first rights of refusal or bars on transfer, is beyond the scope of this
181
article.
The provisions on withdrawal from limited partnerships and LLCs
are not the primary concern of § 2704(b), however. Recall that an applicable restriction looks to restrictions on liquidation of the entity. In
that regard, the default rules for both the Colorado limited partnership and LLC are dissolution and winding up upon an estate tax pertinent event such as death. 82 A limited partnership "is dissolved and its
affairs shall be wound up" upon an event of withdrawal of a general
partner, which includes his or her death, unless there is at least one
175. Id. § 7-80-602.
176. Upon the death of a member, the successor in interest has only the rights of
an assignee. Id. § 7-80-704(1), (3). It would appear that a transferee is only "entitled to
receive the share of profits or other compensation by way of income and the return of
contributions to which that member would otherwise be entitled" and could not resign.
Id. § 7-80-702(1).
177. Id. §§ 7-80-602 to -603.
178. Id. § 7-62-702 (1986).
179. Id. § 7-62-704.
180. See id. § 7-80-702 (Supp. 1996).
181. The Internal Revenue Code defines "applicable restrictions" in terms of limitations on the ability of the entity to liquidate. I.R.C. § 2704(b) (1994). A transfer restriction does not seem to be a restriction on liquidation, but since voting rights flow from
admission as a member or partner, the ability to vote on or control liquidation is impacted indirectly. This section also permits the IRS to issue regulations that would disregard other restrictions that reduce the value of the transferred interest but do not ultimately reduce the value of the interest to the transferee. Id. § 2704(b)(4). Might this
apply in some situations? Perhaps not; the Conference Committee Report in the general
language introducing § 2704 states: "These rules do not affect minority discounts or
other discounts available under present law." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, HR. CoNF. REP. No. 101-5835, at 1137 (1990). On the other hand, if the transfer
restriction is a purchase option, Internal Revenue Code § 2703 could apply.
182. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 7-62-801 (1986) (stating when a limited partnership is
dissolved); id. § 7-80-801 (Supp. 1996) (stating when an LLC is dissolved).
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other general partner and the written provisions of the partnership
agreement permit the business of the limited partnership to be carried
on by the remaining general partner.18 3 That would seem to constitute
an "applicable restriction," the saving grace being that dissolution is
triggered only with respect to general partner events.18 Similarly, a
Colorado LLC is dissolved upon the death of any member unless the
business is continued by the consent of all the remaining members. 185
If there is a written agreement in advance of an event of dissolution to
continue the LLC or if the members eliminate death, for example, as
an event of dissolution, 186 it would seem that this would constitute an
"applicable restriction" that would be disregarded. Accordingly, a limited partner interest would apparently present a greater discount at
death to the estate of the holder than an LLC interest because poten187
tial dissolution is not triggered by the death of a limited partner.
To address the perceived estate planning shortcomings of the limited partnership and LLC, the Colorado answer was the creation of a
new entity. In 1995 Colorado adopted a new entity, the limited partnership association, 8 for which many of the § 2704(b) issues are limited. For example, under the default rules of the statute, an interest
may be transferred only as provided in the bylaws, so the default rule
is nontransferability. 8 9 If an absolute prohibition on alienation is permissible by law, then a strong discount for lack of marketability is certainly suggested. As a default matter, a member may not resign or
withdraw. 90 With respect to the critical issue of dissolution and termination, the default provision is of "indefinite" duration.' 9 ' Recent statistics from the Colorado Secretary of State, reporting that only eighteen LPAs have been formed, 92 suggest that Colorado practitioners are
not comfortable with the LPA or are not convinced of its benefits.
In the aftermath of check-the-box and the inevitable delinking of
the state law forms from the old income tax classification-driven
norms, it would seem that the no-transfer, no-dissolution approach of
the Colorado LPA statute will be appealing to users motivated by
183. Id. § 7-62-801 (Supp. 1996).
184. In structuring a family limited partnership, a corporate general partner or
other entity is often used to practically limit the effects of death on the entity.
185. COLO. REV.STAT. § 7-80-801 (Supp. 1996).
186. The Colorado LLC statute is "flexible" and the operating agreement could provide that the LLC would not dissolve upon the occurrence of such statutory events. See
id. § 7-80-108(3)(b).
187. Id. § 7-62-801. As stated in a recent comparison of entity choices in Colorado,
"[tihus, the discount for a [LLC] membership interest passing at death may be less than
that applicable to a LP interest." Robert R. Keatinge et al., Choice of Entity in Colorado: An Update, COLO. LAw., Oct. 1996, at 3, 46.
188. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-63-101 to -117 (Supp. 1996).
189. Id. § 7-63-114(4).
190. Id.
191. Id. § 7-63-116(1).
192. Telephone Interview with staff at the office of Victoria Buckley, Colorado Secretary of State (Oct. 3, 1996).
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transfer tax savings. It could be that other users would find perpetual
life desirable, and perhaps would find the same to be true for
transferability.
Beyond the immediate details of avoiding the sweep of the Chapter 14 valuation rules, one must question the narrow focus of Congress
in the "applicable restriction" game and its emphasis on default rules.
This exemption from § 2704(b) apparently reflects skepticism about
the permanency of restrictions found in the organizational documents
of businesses under family control. That is, even if a restriction appears in a document, thereby depressing the value of the entity interests at a relevant time, the restriction might be thereafter waived,
modified, eliminated, or ignored because of the family relationship of
the controlling owners. 193 While the base line of default provisions, prescribed by statute, at first blush is not susceptible to this type of manipulation, that is not true upon further consideration. The default
provisions are manipulable by a change in the entity itself (e.g., limited partnership versus LLC) and by a change in the state of formation
(e.g., LLC and limited partnership statutes vary from state to state
with respect to key provisions). A family can accomplish these changes
through a simple merger of the operating entity into a shell entity,
newly formed for the purpose. Thus, if states follow the pattern of Colorado in manipulating the default rules for wealth transfer taxation
advantage, § 2704(b) will become ineffective at preventing abuse of the
minority discount valuation adjustment.
Although beyond the scope of this article, serious consideration
should be given to modifying the federal estate transfer taxation rules
themselves as the root of the problem. Because the revenue yield of
the wealth transfer tax is modest in comparison with other federal
taxes, and the transaction costs of planning for, complying with, and
administering the tax may well exceed its yield, it is frequently asserted that the entire system should be repealed.194 If the entire system is not to be scrapped, an abrupt departure from the present system's reliance on traditional valuation techniques would be
amendments to Chapter 14 that eliminate, for valuation purposes, any
entity-created discounts in family-controlled enterprises. A literal reading of § 2704(b) already suggests that result with respect to liquidation
restrictions. Determining the boundaries of an "entity-created discount" would be difficult, however, and probably unworkable.
A less drastic approach, and one that could be administrable,
would apply family attribution rules to the determination of control
over the entity. That approach would reduce or potentially eliminate
minority discounts and discounts based on transfer restrictions if the
other interests in the entity were held in whole or in part by other
193. See I.R.C. § 2704(b) (1994).
194. See generally Wayne M. Gazur, Congressional Diversions: Legislative Responses to the Estate Valuation Freeze, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 95, 101-12 (1989) (discussing arguments for and against wealth transfer taxes and summarizing alternatives).
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family members. The legislation would essentially reverse the result in
Estate of Bright v. United States.9 5 This approach was taken in the
House Ways and Means Committee version of the Revenue Act of
196
1987, but was not included in the final legislation.
To save the discount but make it less dependent on firm form, another approach would be to penalize, in some fashion, subsequent
waivers, amendments, or removals of the restrictions that gave rise to
the earlier discount; this would address the alleged impermanence of
family-controlled discount structures. This is the approach taken in In97
ternal Revenue Code § 2701(d) with respect to unpaid distributions.
There are alternatives; the question is whether frustration with compliance costs, on the one hand, or revenue loss, on the other, will provide the impetus for change.
IV.

A.

OUTLINES OF A UNIFIED LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY STATUTE

Introduction

Our recommendation for a Small Business Limited Liability Entity Statute has four parts. Part One is a core set of provisions on registration and limited liability that applies to all forms organized
under the statute. In this respect, our proposal resembles the 'hub" of
the Pennsylvania entity proposal. 198 Parts Two through Four contain
the provisions for each of three elective organizational structures. We
lay out only the barest outlines of the statute to give readers an idea
of how our proposal might work out in practice. Inherent in such a
proposal, of course, is a plethora of choices on individual policy questions. We aim not to focus on such choices, although we make them,
but on the general sense of our proposal.
The content of Part One, the core provisions, is minimal because,
similar to the hub in the Pennsylvania statute, it promises to be the
most difficult to amend. With respect to the elective proposals, we aim
195. 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981). The IRS subsequently conceded the result of Estate of Bright in Revenue Ruling 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
196. See Gazur, supra note 194, at 120-22.
197. I.R.C. § 2701(d) (1994). Section 2701 values interests retained by the elder
generation/donor in a family business structure. Id. § 2701. The statute was aimed at
abuses in which taxpayers overstated the value of the retained interest (thereby understating the value of the subordinate interests gifted to family members). The statute ascribes no value to the retained interest unless it is a "qualified payment." Id.
§ 2701(a)(3). If the dividend on corporate stock or other qualified payment on which the
valuation was based is not in fact paid, § 2701(d) increases the donor's gift or estate by
roughly the amount of the payments in arrears. This is to be contrasted with § 2704(a)
that creates a gift, or increases the taxpayer's estate, by the amount by which a lapse of
any voting or liquidation right otherwise decreases the value of the retained interest.
This is the converse situation, aimed at the result in Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987).
198. For a brief explanation of the Pennsylvania "hub and spoke" organization, see
supra notes 30, 136-40 and accompanying text.

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

to accomplish two objectives. First, we hope to eliminate the continuing external effects of the importance placed on titles by the system,
which we have already discussed at some length. 199 Second, we hope
that the elective proposals, formulated in a single unified context, provide a clearer choice than available under the current system, which is
marked by a trend toward common provisions, 200 on the one hand, and
idiosyncratic, historical accidents, on the other.
B. Part One-Core Provisions
Registration of entities has three functions: it grants firms the
power to sue and be sued as jural entities; it grants firms the power to
offer investors limited liability on firm debts and obligations; and it
supports state franchise fees. Part One contains the basic requirements for and effects of registration. Any individual can file with a
named state official a request for certification as a limited liability entity. The filing need only contain a firm name, a designated office for
service of process within the state, and an election to be treated as one
of the three alternative forms. On receipt of the form by the designated state official, the entity's life begins and limited liability attaches to all the firm's investors. Housekeeping provisions would be required for routine matters such as appropriate names, the effect of
defective registration and false claims of registration, and the power of
the state to suspend registration and, absent a cure, to dissolve an entity on the failure of any entity to pay its annual fees.
The name of the entity, normally a mundane issue, requires some
thought. It seems that if we are to free ourselves of the collateral consequences of titles, we do not want to use titles like "company" or
"partnership." For the same reasons, and also to avoid per se checkthe-box classification as a corporation, we should also avoid "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," or "inc"2 °1 The inclusion of "ltd." could be
desirable to place third parties on notice of the potential limited liability aspects of the entity. However, that language could also create
some confusion due to its inclusion as an available name in some cor199. For a discussion of the importance of titles in the current system, see supra
Part I.B.2.
200. For example, the attribute of limited liability-once the great dividing line between corporations and other entities-has now been extended to all participants
through the development of the LLC, LLP, and LLLP. With the check-the-box regulations, it is likely that the LLO statutes will be amended so that LLCs will no longer be
subject to dissolution on account of member events, thereby more closely resembling the
traditional corporation. Could a modification of the events of dissolution for limited partnerships be next? While further developments may be stunted by the arrival of the LLC
as an alternative, the development of close corporation supplements has recently reflected a movement by corporations toward the more flexible, contractual approach. The
new versions of the general partnership statutes are also liberalizing the parties' contractual powers.
201. For a aiscussion of classification as a corporation based on these descriptions,
see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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porate2 2 and limited partnership statutes. 2 3 All things considered, we
propose the name "limited liability entity" and its abbreviation, "LLE"
or "L.L.E."
Organizers who like the designation of "partner" or "company"
would need to look elsewhere. On the other hand, a member of a limited liability entity would be referred to as a "participant." We don't
want to be title-driven ourselves, but "partner" is not appropriate; that
term encompasses a separate body of law (which could wither under
our proposal) that we do not want to confuse with our entity. "Shareholder" is an obvious corporate term that again could confuse the corporate body of law with ours, and we do not want to create any per se
corporation concerns under the check-the-box system. We have not chosen "associate" because the term could suggest that one-participant entities could not be formed; it is our intention that our proposals would
accommodate single participants.
There are some issues that should be coordinated for all of the alternatives, but on which we do not have a particular opinion. For example, should piercing the limited liability veil be addressed, linked to
other standards like corporate doctrine, or mitigated? The Colorado
LLC statute, for example, incorporates "the case law which interprets
the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a
corporation may be pierced under Colorado law."20 4 In addition, it further provides that the failure to observe the formalities or requirements relating to the management of the business and affairs of the
LLC is not in itself a ground for imposing personal liability.2 5 Should
there be a penalty imposed at the entity level for wrongful distributions in addition to the penalties already provided by fraudulent conveyance statutes? 20 6 And if so, what should be the standard? 20 7 Finally,
202. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4.01(a)(1) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(a)(1) (Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-104-101(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
203. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA) § 102(1), 6A U.L.A. 67
(1995). RULPA states that the name of the limited partnership "shall contain without
abbreviation the words 'limited partnership.'" Id. However, the Colorado adoption permits the use of "Ltd. standing alone. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-62-102(1)(a) (1986).
204. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107(1) (Supp. 1996).
205. Id. § 7-80-107(2) (providing the same protection under uniform law); see also
UNriP. LTD. LI.A Co. ACT (ULLCA) § 303(b), 6A U.L.A. 454 (1995). Professor Ribstein has
argued that such language is wrong-headed and that the better solution is to eliminate
useless statutory formalities and to specify consequences for the failure to observe those
that are retained. Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 348 (1995).
206. The drafters, including Professor Ribstein as reporter, of the Prototype Limited Liability Company Act rejected any limitations of this nature, relying on the general
fraudulent conveyance laws of the applicable jurisdiction. PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT
§ 603 cmt. (1992).
207. RULPA's section 607 prohibits distributions if the liabilities of the limited
partnership would exceed the fair value of the partnership assets. REVISED UNIF. LTD.
PARTNERSHIP ACT (RULPA) § 607, 6A U.L.A. 225 (1995). The Delaware LLC statute, for
example, prescribes a similar rule. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-607 (1993). The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, on the other hand, prescribes both an equity in-
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a clear choice of law provision should be adopted, and we would adopt
a corporate approach to the effect that the laws of the jurisdiction
under which the entity is organized govern the entity and its internal
20 8
affairs and the liability of its members.

Under all of the alternatives, perpetual life is the default result;
events occurring with respect to the members are not relevant. This
should help with respect to wealth transfer taxation valuations, 2 9 but
that is not our purpose. We believe that perpetual life of the entity
form would be desired by most organizers. Perpetual life has its
problems-if a put or other exit right is not negotiated by the parties
in advance, death can create hardship for the decedent's heirs who are
otherwise locked into their investment.210 We have provided for a put
in the event of a member's death in Part Two, which would be used by
the most closely held businesses without passive investors, but not in
2
the other alternatives.

11

solvency and bankruptcy insolvency rule. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 6.40(c)
(1984).
208. RUPA's choice of law provisions have been criticized as lacking certainty of result. See Vestal, supra note 89, at 243-56.
209. For a discussion of how nondissolubility upon a member's death enhances a
discount for wealth transfer taxation purposes, see supra text accompanying notes 17887.
210. Because the right to payoff may be costly for the members who wish to
continue, many firms may choose to draft around it. The buyout right, however, is an appropriate default rule for the most closely-held firms, which
often operate without a detailed agreement. The buyout right gives members
some liquidity and thereby reduces the risk that a controlling faction will
take advantage of a "frozen-in" minority.
Ribstein, supra note 171, at 66. ULLCA provides for put rights in an at-will LLC. UNi.
LTD. LmjB. Co. AcT (ULLCA) § 701, 6A U.L.A. 476-77 (1995). In that regard, the immediate put right under ULLCA is unavailable if the organizers opt for a set term, as opposed to an at-will LLC. Id. Dean Haynsworth and other members of the drafting committee believed that this would be a choice with obvious consequences, apparently even
for the unsophisticated: "[Tihe requirement that the specified term be stated in the articles of organization was deemed to be a simple but reasonable indication that the members understood the basic consequences of becoming a term LLC" Harry J. Haynsworth,
At-Will and Term LLCs Are Treated Differently Under Uniform Act, 2 J. LIMITED LiABILITY COMI'ANis 12, 17 (1995). Dean Haynsworth has defended ULLCA's inclusion of a
member put in an at-will LLC as the default provision. The concern again was that "continuity similar to that which exists in a corporation, would... lead to the same kind of
protracted, expensive, disruptive, and often inconclusive litigation involving close corporation shareholder claims of dissension, alleged squeeze outs, oppression, and frustration
of reasonable expectations" Id. Professor Gevurtz concludes that LLC statutes should
follow a limited partnership model and permit members to require that their interest be
bought out by the company, unless otherwise agreed. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, SqueezeOuts and Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 513-17
(1995). See generally Carter G. Bishop, Treatment of Members Upon Their Death and
Withdrawal from a Limited Liability Company: The Case for a Uniform Paradigm, 25
STErSON L. REv. 255 (1995) (comparing ULLCA and existing state LLC statutes in terms
of withdrawal remedies).
211. The absence of a put in the third alternative will support the creation of a liquidity discount for estate planning purposes, although the alternative is not particu-
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C. Part Two-The Form for Group One: All Investors Are Active in
Management
Part Two contains the structural rules for a firm that is characterized by an absence of passive equity investors. The typical business is
owned and run by a small group of friends or family members. All equity investors are active in management. The rules are a modern adaptation of the rules of a general partnership. The closest modern
analogy therefore, is the limited liability partnership.
Absent an agreement specifying executive offices (with attendant
powers and responsibilities), 212 all equity investors participate equally
in the management of the firm. In that context, with no managers, the
outlines of apparent authority would need to be addressed. 213 The default assumption is that all equity investors merit equal salary and all
have contributed equally to the firm's capital. Thus, if any one investor
receives a salary or other firm payment for management activities, absent an agreement, all investors must receive an equal amount. Similarly, any payments in return of capital must, absent an agreement, be
made equally to all equity investors. The situation of a deceased member is problematic; the estate cannot practically work for a salary. Accordingly, we propose that, as a default matter subject to modification
by the parties, a put should14be prescribed on the occasion of the death
2
or incapacity of a member.

Because of the close-knit management style of this option, it is
likely that the members would wish to control membership, which directly impacts transferability. In a general corporate model, stock is
freely alienable, although the shareholders can agree to impose restrictions.215 In a partnership or LLC model, the financial interest of a
partner or member can be freely alienable, but it requires the agreement of the other partners or members for the transferee's admission
as a full partner or member.2 16 For simplicity, we adopt the close corporate statute model because it deals with all of the interest, rather than
bifurcating it. In that regard, restrictions along the line of sections 11
larly structured with that in mind.

212. This would be analogous to a corporate officer or the manager of an LLC.
213. We decline to adopt an express partnership rule that every participant is an
agent of the entity. But see UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (EJPA) § 9, 6 U.L.A. 400 (1995); id.
§ 301, 6 U.LA.33. On the other hand, if managers were designated, it would be appropriate to statutorily delineate the boundaries of their authority.
214. Cf MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP. §§ 14-17 (1984) (providing for a compulsory purchase right upon the death of a shareholder).
215. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1984) (describing shareholders' abilities to restrict the transfer of shares).
216. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT (ULPA) §§ 502-503, 6 U.L.A. 66-67
(1995) (stating a partner's ability to transfer interest and the transferee's resulting
rights); UNiF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (ULLCA) § 501-503, 6A U.L.A. 468-69 (1995) (stating
the rights of a transferor and transferee of a distributional interest in a limited liability
company).
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and 12 of the Model Statutory Close CorporationSupplement could be
217
appropriate, subject, of course, to the agreement of the parties.
Absent an agreement, a majority of the investors must agree to
major firm decisions; any one investor can make choices in the normal
course of business. Investors participating in management owe, at
minimum, a duty of loyalty to the entity and a duty to refrain from
any other intentional or reckless misconduct that causes injury to the
entity. The parties can add additional duties by contract and further
specify the content of the minimum duties. However, they cannot eliminate the duties altogether, although our last Form for Group Three
would permit that. In this manner, within one proposal we have accommodated both views of this issue-one that already has produced a
218
great deal of scholarly discourse.
A decision by a majority of the equity investors to exclude for
cause any investor from management responsibilities gives the firm,
absent an agreement, the continuing election to suspend payments for
management activities, paying a risk-free rate of return on his or her
capital account, or to force the excluded investor to leave on a payment
of cash equal to his or her allocated share of the firm's assets, based
on liquidation values and net of damages caused by his or her misconduct. Whatever the firm's election, the firm, as against the excluded
investor, has any remedy provided by contract law for damages for additional injury to the firm. If the exclusion is without cause, the investor has a choice (non-waivable until after the decision to exclude is
made or threatened) of all appropriate remedies supplied by the law of
contracts for a material breach as well as a request that a court dissolve the firm.
Any decision to abandon this Form, through amendment, merger
or otherwise, must be made by unanimous vote.
217.

The Model Statutory Close CorporationSupplement generally provides that an

interest in the shares of a corporation cannot be transferred except to the extent provided in the articles of incorporation. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 11. There
are exceptions for transfers to other shareholders, members of the shareholder's family,
unanimously approved transfers, transfers to one's estate, and pledges of stock as collateral. Id. § 11(b). However, the supplement permits a transfer of the shares, subject to a
right of first refusal in favor of the corporation. Id. § 12.
218. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 552-53 (1990) (offering the duty of loyalty as a
"market mimicking" rule that everyone would want); Henry N. Butler & Larry E.
Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians,65
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990) (stating the contractarian position); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1465-66, 1469-70 (1989) (arguing
that participants cannot foresee the circumstances to which a waiver of duty would apply nor appreciate the risks); Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUIm. L. Rsv. 1599, 1601 (1989) (asserting that shareholders would not eliminate the duty of loyalty because it would license
theft); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U L. REv. 523, 541 (1993) (discussing how the contractarian
approach disadvantages unsophisticated participants, those without sufficient resources
to engage counsel, and those without adequate experience to appreciate the problem).

1997]

LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY STATUTE

D. Part Three-The Form for Group Two: UnsophisticatedPassive Investors with Exit Rights
The second Form of small business limited liability entity assumes
a small firm run by a majority of the equity investors as insiders, with
a minority of the equity investors contributing capital and nothing
else. This arrangement resembles a limited partnership or a statutory
close corporation. The passive minority want special protections from
opportunistic behavior by the insiders. The most important form of
their protection is some form of an exit right.
All passive minority investors have a continuing right to put their
interest back to the firm for cash equal to a proportionate share of the
firm's value. The put right may, by contract, be limited to either vest
three years or more from the minority investors' contribution or, again
by contract, to be contingent upon misconduct by the majority-at
minimum, breaches of their duty of loyalty to the firm or other intentional or reckless injury to the firm. In drafting the contingent put for
misbehavior, we would again draw from the Model Statutory Close
CorporationSupplement. 19 The parties would probably wish to control
membership, so we would include, as a default matter subject to revision by the parties, transfer restrictions resembling those in the first
220
Form.
The majority insiders in such a firm have a duty to report annually to the passive investors, with the reports to include summary
financials and a textual history of the year's business activities. They
also have the traditional duty of loyalty and a streamlined duty of care
against intentional or reckless behavior, enforceable through a participants' derivative action. Any decision to abandon this Form, by amendment, merger or otherwise, must receive a majority vote of the minority investors and will trigger put rights for dissenters.2 21
E. Part Four-The Form for Group Three: Sophisticated Passive
Investors
The third Form, designed for sophisticated parties, is completely
open-ended. The organizers must prepare a written constitutional document that is, either in full or in summary form, made available to all
219. Referring to the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, we would
seek to define misconduct in terms of actions that are "illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or
unfairly prejudicial" toward the holder of the put. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SUPP.

§ 40(a)(1). The terms of the purchase of shares pursuant to the put could be crafted
along the lines of another section of the supplement, calling for the determination of the
fair value of the shares. Id. § 42.
220. For a discussion of transfer restrictions, see supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
221. Of course, with a true majority versus minority squeeze-out situation, a majority approval of salary agreements would not protect the minority, unless one wishes
to exchange majority rule for rule by minority holdout. The put right for dissenters is
the compromise.
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equity investors at the time of their investments. The constitutional
document specifies the complete organizational structure of the firm,
including how the structure is amended. Investors may sue for breach
of the document under traditional contract law theories or may sue for
fraud or misrepresentation by organizers at the time of investment.
The default rules could be provided by the state's general corporate
code, if it is modern and lacks heavy and numerous mandatory provisions, which, with the exception of the corporate registration provisions, could be incorporated by reference or repeated in full. 22
The Form is designed to be of use by a wide variety of sophisticated parties. Investment bankers can design Special Purpose Vehicles
(SPVs) 223 for structured financing; venture capitalists can design investment associations; and entrepreneurs of high-tech enterprises can
design structures that accommodate venture capital. Finally, those
looking for pass-through tax treatment, but in the context of a wellunderstood small corporate structure, can rely on the default rules in
the Form.
CONCLUSION

With the traditional tax distinctions for small businesses eliminated, it would appear that, with the exception of the extension of limited liability to all participants, several of the newly minted small business entities have lost their underpinnings. Moreover, due to our
preoccupation with simple titles in regulatory systems affecting firm
operations, the newest amendments to the various registration statutes appear to be moving them inexorably closer together in substance,
rather than offering entrepreneurs meaningful differences. This array
of organizational alternatives is not without costs as practitioners, clients, and regulatory agencies struggle to master their nuances. We
need to start from scratch.
Our recommendation consists of a Limited Liability Entity (LLE)
statute that offers three alternatives to organizers that contain real
operational differences. While our proposal is far from fully developed,
and incorporates some controversial positions on individual issues, we
hope that it will be part of a needed reappraisal of state laws for
closely held business organizations in the check-the-box era.

222. This incorporation by reference to the corporate codes will hopefully not trigger per se corporate classification under the check-the-box regulations.
223. See Committee on Bankr. and Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 108 (discussing structured financing techniques, including uses of SPVs).

